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Abstract6
Recent evidence of correlated trading among networked fund managers provides7
an indication that professional investors exchange investment ideas. To examine the8
motivations underlying this type of collaboration, we design a laboratory experiment9
in which competing fund managers share ideas until either chance or one of the fund10
managers (by choice to obtain a competitive advantage) terminates the exchange. We11
find that managers are more willing, and likely, to share when their rival’s ability and12
intention to share in return are high. For a manager’s decision to share, subjective13
expectations about rivals’ intentions matter more than common expectations about14
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1 Introduction20
Every year, hedge fund managers in the U.S. and around the world spend billions of dol-21
lars collecting, and protecting, investment ideas they believe will bring value to their fund.22
In doing so, fund managers have been known to utilize some rather unscrupulous meth-23
ods to gather this type of information, while simultaneously engaging in protracted, and24
expensive, litigation in order to protect their own information.1 This has often led to the25
characterization of the professional investment world as one populated by cutthroat fund26
managers who will do anything to gain an edge on their peers and on the market. How-27
ever, despite this popular depiction of the financial world,2 what researchers have observed28
about managerial investment behavior does not always support this narrative. Shiller and29
Pound (1989:47) survey investors and find that “direct interpersonal communications are30
very important in [their] decisions,” and Shiller (2000:155) concludes that “[w]ord-of-mouth31
transmission of ideas appears to be an important contributor to day-to-day or hour-to-hour32
stock market fluctuations.” More recent empirical evidence, documenting the extent to which33
financial trades are correlated,3 suggests that information sharing among investors continues34
unabated, and that even hedge fund managers in direct competition with one another ap-35
pear to share investment ideas. It is surprising that—in spite of the large sunk costs funds36
incur to ensure informational security and the potentially larger opportunity costs incurred37
by disclosing valuable investment ideas—there appears to be evidence suggesting that man-38
agers circumvent their own safeguards in order to collaborate with rivals. In this paper,39
1See, for example, Schmerken (2014) or Hamilton and Sangster (2012). Vardi (2013) describes how hedge
funds use espionage-like tactics for information discovery. Finally see the many reports in The HedgeFund
Law Report (http://www.hflawreport.com/articles/by/topic/431) concerning litigation by hedge funds
against employees—current and former—for disclosing, or stealing, proprietary information.
2For this characterization of the industry as “cut-throat,” see, for instance, MacDonald (2007) (“the
cut-throat, male-dominated world of hedge funds”), Sorkin (2008) (“the hedge fund business is far more
cut-throat”), Leopold (2013), or Mohamed El-Erian’s (CEO of PIMCO) Foreword in Ahuja (2012:xii).
3See Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Hau (2001), Feng and Seasholes (2004), Hong, Kubik, and Stein
(2004), Ivkovic´ and Weisbenner (2005), Brown, Ivkovic´, Smith, and Weisbenner (2008), Shive (2010), Ger-
ritzen, Jackwerth, and Plazzi (2016), or Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2015).
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we examine factors that motivate hedge fund managers to behave as comrades rather than40
cutthroats.41
Most of the empirical literature is forced to be agnostic about the exact nature of42
the correlated trading effect because of data limitations (e.g., we cannot observe informa-43
tion sharing, only its effect). However, a myriad of recent theoretical arguments attempt44
to explain the mechanism behind the correlated trading phenomenon.4 A compelling theo-45
retical explanation for correlated trading postulates that fund managers make investments46
based on their respective information sets. If a fund manager shares investment ideas with47
another manager, their information sets become more correlated and, in turn, so do their48
investments. Stein (2008) demonstrates that a mutual gain from collaboration (e.g., from49
sharing ideas) is sufficient to justify communication among fund managers.5 In his model,50
competing managers are willing to share ideas for investment opportunities with rivals when51
they expect to receive feedback in the form of additional ideas or a refinement of the original52
idea.6 However, because we can not directly observe communication between managers,7 this53
theory of a collaborative exchange of information is difficult to test empirically. Yet, if we54
believe that correlated trading is a result of the direct communication of investment ideas,55
then a thorough examination of the motivation underlying such collaboration may help us56
uncover evidence of its existence. We propose an experimental approach, which has the twin57
4See Duffie and Manso (2007), Colla and Mele (2010), Manela (2014), or Andrei and Cujean (2015).
5We acknowledge that this is not the only potential process through which the information sets of two
hedge fund managers may become correlated. For instance, Dow and Gorton (1994) argue that traders
invest only if they expect other traders to enter the market with sufficiently high probability. Revealing
private information—or, talking their books—increases other traders’ awareness and potentially induces more
investment. Or, as Crawford, Gray, and Kern (forthcoming) argue in the context of the framework by Pontiff
(2006), a trader may share information to induce other traders to enter and push the price of a mis-priced
security towards its fundamental value. However, we show that a mutual gain from collaboration alone is
sufficient to justify collaboration. We leave tests of other potential channels—such as the described awareness
argument—for future research.
6To clarify, here feedback is not a process in which a critical evaluation of the idea is returned to the
manager; rather, feedback arrives in the form of an additional idea or a refinement of the original idea that
is shared with the initiating fund manager.
7The literature on correlated trading does not observe communication between investors but merely infers
such. A notable exception is Crawford, Gray, and Kern (forthcoming), who observe communication (i.e.,
feedback) in a unique data set from a social network website.
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advantages of being able to overcome the lack of empirically observable communication, and58
of being a direct test of the behavioral motivation to collaborate with a rival.59
We find that a manager’s willingness to share an idea increases in her expectations60
of receiving feedback. We argue that the manager’s expectation of receiving feedback from61
a rival crucially depends on two aspects. First, a rival manager must have the ability to62
provide feedback by sharing an idea; this is objective, because in our model and experiment,63
the managers know each other’s abilities.8 Second, a rival manager must have the intention64
of providing feedback. This portion of a manager’s expectation is subjective, and we show65
that subjects form complex beliefs about their rival’s intention to continue collaboration.66
Thus, a fund manager expects to receive feedback from a rival manager if both the rival’s67
ability and intention to provide feedback are sufficiently strong. Our unique experimental68
design allows us to dissect the expectation of feedback and study the effects of ability and69
intention in isolation.970
We present three sets of results. First, a fund manager’s expectation about her71
rival’s intention to provide feedback has a greater impact on the fund manager’s decision72
to exchange information than does the rival’s ability to provide feedback. Second, a rival’s73
ability has a stronger effect on a fund manager’s decision to exchange information than the74
fund manager’s own ability. This implies that a less able fund manager is more likely, and75
more willing, to share information with a more able fund manager, and vice versa. Third, we76
provide an in-depth examination into the determinants of the subjective expectations formed77
by the fund managers. We find that subjects form expectations about their rival’s intention78
8Note that we do not model the formation of the network in which the rival managers reside. We implicitly
assume that a network exists, and that, given this connection, rivals have knowledge of each other’s ability.
9A common concern regarding laboratory experiments is one of external validity. For recent contributions,
see Levitt and List (2007a,b, 2008), Camerer (2015), or Kessler and Vesterlund (2015). Fre´chette (2015)
concludes that, for the most part, experiments remain externally valid (i.e., games played by students
and professionals seem to bring about largely the same qualitative outcomes). Similar results have been
obtained in experiments conducted in a finance-specific context, such as in Abbink and Rockenbach (2006)
(option markets with undergraduate students and traders at a large German bank), Cooper, Kagel, Lo, and
Kagel (1999) (strategic markets game with students and managers), Cooper (2006) (effort turn-around game
with undergraduate students and executive MBA students), or Alevy, Haigh, and List (2007) (information
cascades with MBA students and Chicago Board of Trade traders).
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to share ideas in a manner that comports quite closely with our theoretical predictions about79
behavior. Finally, it is important to note that these results hold even when we control for80
personal connections, the prevalence of social norms (i.e., fairness and trustworthiness), or81
risk aversion. Within our study, none of these factors have a consistent effect on a fund82
manager’s decision to share information. This implies that even rival managers who are not83
comrades are willing to exchange information driven only by their expectations of receiving84
feedback.85
Our experimental implementation employs a hedge fund management framework in86
which players exchange “ideas” for investment opportunities.10 Communication is a process87
of back-and-forth sharing of ideas between two hedge fund managers. In each round, a fund88
manager has the chance to generate a new idea to share. The probability of doing so reflects89
a manager’s ability. If a manager generates a new idea, she must decide to share the idea90
with her rival fund manager or conceal it. If she conceals the idea so that no new information91
is exchanged, the communication ends. If, instead, she shares the idea, then her rival is given92
the chance to generate a new idea according to her ability. If the rival generates a new idea,93
she can either share this idea (and thus provide “feedback”) or conceal the idea. If any of94
the fund managers fail to generate a new idea, then no new information can be shared and95
the communication ends. The game thus continues an indeterminate number of rounds and96
ends if either a manager decides to conceal an idea or a manager fails to generate a new idea.97
Managers compete across potential investors for their fund, and each manager exerts98
monopolistic control over a fraction of the market and competes with other managers over99
the remaining portion. A manager’s compensation increases in the absolute number of100
investment ideas that she possesses at the end of the game.11 This part of a manager’s payoffs101
accrues from the monopolistic segment of the market. This is akin to the portion of a fund102
10Experimental instructions and a detailed description of the game are provided in the Online Appendix,
available from the authors upon request.
11In game-theoretical terms, our model represents a dynamic and multi-stage yet one-time interaction
between fund managers. However, we note that a repeated game (e.g., one in which payoffs are materialized
after each round of sharing) would likely introduce a form of “reputational” concern into the managers’
incentives to share an idea.
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manager’s compensation that stems from good performance with the investor capital already103
under her control. In addition, if a manager holds more ideas than her rival, she captures104
the competitive segment of the market as well. Thus, the fund manager with the best105
relative investment performance captures all the remaining uncommitted investor capital.106
This combination of the absolute and relative number of ideas introduces a straightforward107
trade-off: on the one hand, it incentivizes managers to share ideas so as to increase the108
number of ideas and thus increase payoffs from the monopolistic side of the market; on109
the other hand, it gives each manager an incentive to conceal ideas in order to capture the110
competitive side of the market.12 In order to disentangle the effect of a manager’s own ability111
from her rival’s ability, we develop an asymmetric extension of the model in Stein (2008)112
in which we allow fund managers to have different abilities (i.e., different probabilities of113
success of generating a new idea), and we vary the distribution of ability throughout the114
game.13115
In addition to the literature on correlated trading and communication between in-116
vestors or fund managers, our paper contributes to a number of areas. Our results relate117
to the general literature on disclosure and exchange of information among agents with com-118
peting interests (Stein, 2008; Hellmann and Perotti, 2011; Dziuda and Gradwohl, 2015; Au-119
genblick and Bodoh-Creed, 2014; Ganglmair and Tarantino, 2014; Guttman, Kremer, and120
Skrzypacz, 2014). As for empirical evidence, von Hippel (1987) provides results for informa-121
tion sharing in the steel minimill industry and Ha¨ussler (2011), Ha¨ussler, Jiang, Thursby,122
and Thursby (2013) in academic research; Ga¨chter, von Krogh, and Haeflinger (2010) present123
experimental results for a setting in which private investors fund public goods innovation.124
Our results further contribute to a growing literature in experimental finance.125
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our126
12This feature of the model (i.e., the gains from concealing information [“secrecy”] are instantaneous
whereas the benefits from sharing [“disclosure”] are delayed and dependent on others’ actions) is akin to the
trade-off in Mukherjee and Stern (2009).
13We present this asymmetric extension of the model in Section 2. Additional notation and results are
relegated to the Online Appendix.
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theoretical framework. In Section 3, we motivate our framework and relate its features to127
the reality of hedge fund markets. In Section 4, we discuss the experimental design and128
derive the hypotheses from our theoretical predictions. In Section 5, we present our main129
results. We conduct robustness checks in Section 6. We summarize in Section 7.130
2 A Model of Word-of-Mouth Communication131
2.1 Basic Framework132
In our analysis we consider an asymmetric version of the model in Stein (2008) in which133
players exchange ideas for investment opportunities and where more ideas increase value.134
The incentive to share an idea depends on the probability of receiving an idea in return135
(i.e., “feedback”). Our theoretical model separates one’s ability to share an idea (which is136
by a commonly known, that is, objective probability) from one’s intention to share (which137
requires a rival to form subjective expectations).138
2.1.1 Decisions and Timing139
Two players—we shall call them fund managers (FM)—take turns in generating and sharing140
new ideas for investment opportunities. FM A moves in odd rounds, and FM B moves in141
even rounds. FM A begins in round t = 1 with an existing idea and must decide whether to142
share it with FM B. In all future rounds t ≥ 2, FM i = A,B then generates one new idea143
with success probability pi,t and must decide whether to share this new idea with FM j ≠ i144
or conceal it. This probability pi,t depends on the previous round’s action but is otherwise145
time-invariant:146
pi,t = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
pi if FM j shared an idea in t − 1
0 if no idea was shared in t − 1. (1)
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Figure 1: Timeline of Word-of-Mouth Communication
The figure depicts the timeline and structure of the game of word-of-mouth communication. FM A initially hold one idea, and
FM B holds 0 ideas. FM A in t = 1 decides to share or conceal her initial idea. In all t ≥ 2, FM i generates a new idea with
probability pi,t and decides to share this idea with FM j or conceal the idea. The game continues until one of the FMs fails to
generate a new idea or decides to conceal.




























An assumption of strict complementarity in the generation of ideas (Stein, 2008; Hellmann147
and Perotti, 2011; Ganglmair and Tarantino, 2014) implies that communication continues148
until one player fails to generate a new idea (i.e., termination by chance) or decides to conceal149
a newly generated idea (i.e., termination by choice).150
The timeline of the game and structure of the decision-making is depicted in Figure 1.151
The hollow circle indicates the first round and the beginning of the game in which FM A152
decides whether to share or conceal her initial idea. The triangle indicates a move by chance:153
once FM A has shared, FM B successfully generates a new idea with probability pB but fails154
with probability 1 − pB. If FM B succeeds, she decides whether to share or conceal the new155
idea. This decision is indicated by a solid circle. If a failure occurs, the game ends (indicated156
by a square). The communication continues for an indeterminate number of rounds but has157
a finite expected duration.14158
2.1.2 Payoffs159
An FM’s payoffs are a function of her own stock of ideas ni and her competitor’s stock160
of ideas nj. For the construction of payoffs, we follow Stein (2008) and consider a simple161
14We derive the expected duration of the process in the Online Appendix.
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Figure 2: Fund Managers in Competition
This figure depicts the market for funds in which the fund managers compete. FM i generates payoffs v(ni) from her own
Segment i, where ni denotes FM i’s number of ideas for investment opportunities. The FM with more ideas also generates
profits from the competitive Segment C. These payoffs for FM i are positive if ni > nj and increase in ni − nj .
own Segment A own Segment B
competitive
Segment C
A: v(nA) B: v(nB)A: max{v(nA) − v(nB),0}
B: max{v(nB) − v(nA),0}
1 − θ 1 − θθ
market structure as depicted in Figure 2. We assume that FMs compete for investors in the162
following way: FM i has captured all the investors in her own Segment i (with a market163
share 1 − θ), and the payoffs from this side of the market depend on the stock of ideas ni.164
These payoffs are represented by a function v(ni) that increases in ni at a decreasing rate165
with v(0) = 0. A fraction θ of an FM’s payoffs are generated in the competitive segment of166
the market. This Segment C contains new investors both FMs compete to attract, and the167
FM who finishes with the greater stock of ideas attracts all new investors. The payoffs from168
these new investors are greater when the difference between the two FMs’ respective stocks169
of ideas is greater. In this model, the payoffs for FM i from the competitive Segment C are170
v(ni) − v(nj) if ni > nj, and zero otherwise.171
The payoffs are realized after the game has ended. At this point, FM i’s total realized172
payoffs from her own Segment i and the competitive Segment C are173
Ui = (1 − θ) v(ni) + θmax{v(ni) − v(nj),0} . (2)
When deciding whether to share or to conceal an idea, FM i faces an inter-temporal tradeoff174
and compares her immediate payoffs from concealing (after which the game ends) with the175
expected payoffs from sharing the idea and potentially continuing communication. An FM’s176
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decision to share the idea gives the other FM a chance to generate and later share yet another177
new idea. Sharing in t therefore has the potential to increase the overall stock of ideas. FM i178
therefore benefits from higher future payoffs in her Segment i through this collaboration. At179
the same time, by sharing, FM i runs the risk that FM j conceals her new idea in the next180
round. When FM i conceals the idea in t, then she stays ahead of the other FM and is able181
to reap immediate payoffs from the competitive Segment C.182
2.2 Incentive Compatible Communication183
Formally, provided that stage t is reached (when both FMs have shared ideas in all t− 1), if184
FM i conceals the idea, then she holds ni = t ideas whereas j holds nj = t − 1 ideas. FM i’s185
payoffs in any t ≥ 1 are then:186
Ui(conceal@t) = (1 − θ) v(t) + θ [v(t) − v(t − 1)] = v(t) − θv(t − 1). (3)
If, instead, FM i decides to share the new idea in t ≥ 1, then her expected payoffs depend187
on the expected future stream of ideas, and therefore on how she expects FM j to decide in188
future rounds. Suppose both FMs play time-invariant strategies σi and let189
σ˜j ≡ E(σj) (4)
denote FM i’s subjective expectations of FM j’s mixed strategy (i.e., FM j’s probability of190
sharing or expected intentions). FM i’s expected payoffs15 when she shares a newly generated191
idea in t and all t′ > t are192
EUi(share@t) = (1 − θ) ∞∑
q=0 (pipjσ˜j)q [ (1 − pjσ˜j) v(t + 2q) + pjσ˜j (1 − pi) v(t + 1 + 2q)]. (5)
15In the Online Appendix, we provide the details of how we construct expression (5). Note that we assume
that FM i shares in all t′ > t if she shares in t. This is the same as saying σi = 1. The assumption is a first
step toward characterization of a pure-strategy equilibrium. For a mixed-strategy equilibrium, we assume
stationary strategies and allow for FM i to randomize in each round, σi ∈ [0,1]. We provide these equilibrium
characterizations in the Online Appendix.
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In any round t, FM i expects with probability pij ≡ pjσ˜j to receive feedback from FM j in193
t + 1. This probability is the (objective) probability that FM j generates a new idea in t + 1194
multiplied by the conditional (subjective) probability that FM j shares this new idea.195
At any given t, FM i shares the idea if196
EUi(share@t) ≥ Ui(conceal@t), (6)
given her expectations σ˜j of FM j’s future actions. This condition depends on both FMs’197
probabilities of success (i.e., abilities), as well as FM j’s expected behavior (i.e., intentions).198
In order to simplify the analysis, we follow Stein (2008) and use a geometric-decay199
valuation function v(n) = 1 − βn. Condition (6) can be simplified to read200
φi(pi, pj, σ˜j) ≡ 1 + βpi
1 + βpjσ˜j βpjσ˜j − θ ≥ 0. (7)
The term φi ≡ φi(pi, pj, σ˜j) denotes FM i’s expected net payoffs from sharing. It is positive201
(so that FM i shares) when the expected payoffs from sharing exceed the immediate payoffs202
from concealing the idea, and vice versa.203
For our empirical analysis, we obtain a set of key observations from expression φi: the204
value of φi increases in pi, pj, and σj, rendering the sharing condition in (7) less restrictive.205
This means that FM i is more willing, and thus more likely, to share an idea when her own206
probability pi of generating new ideas in future rounds is high, when FM i’s probability pj of207
generating new ideas in future rounds is high, and when FM i expects FM j to share these208
new ideas with high probability σ˜j.209
Proposition 1. FM i’s sharing condition (7) is less restrictive and FM i is more willing210
and more likely to share a newly generated idea in t when the following holds:211
1. FM j’s probability of success (ability) pj is high;212
2. FM i’s expectations σ˜j that FM j is sharing a new idea (expected intentions) are high;213
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3. FM i’s own probability of success (ability) pi is high.214
Moreover, the effect of FM j’s probability of success pj on FM i’s decision is stronger than215
FM i’s own probability of success pi if pi is not too low.216
Proof. FM i’s sharing condition is less restrictive and i is more likely to share a newly217




= β (1 + βpi) σ˜j(1 + βσ˜jpj)2 > 0;
∂φi
∂σ˜j




1 + βσjpj > 0.





⇐⇒ 1 + βpi
1 + βpjσ˜j > βpj. (8)
This means that the effect of FM j’s probability of success pj is stronger than the effect of221
FM i’s own probability of success pi if pi is not too low. Q.E.D.222
The success probabilities pi and pj reflect FMs’ respective abilities to give feedback,223
whereas the subjective expectations σ˜j capture FM j’s intention to give feedback. For an224
FM, expecting to receive feedback (with probability pij) is therefore not simply a matter of225
the other FM’s ability to do so, but also about expecting the other FM to be willing to226
share an idea. As we can see from condition (7), the ability and intention of the other FM227
are substitutes. Our experimental design allows us to disentangle the effects of ability and228
intention and better understand their empirical substitutability.229
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3 Motivating the Assumptions about Market Struc-230
ture and Communication231
For our results to be valid and relevant, we must ensure that the features of the experimental232
design are a reasonable representation of the hedge fund market. First, we believe that our233
stylized division of the market into a monopolistic segment and a competitive segment is234
a good representation of real hedge fund markets. For instance, when a manager creates a235
fund, the initial investors often agree to a significant lock-in period (sometimes for several236
years) in which they cannot withdraw any invested money from the fund (Agarwal and237
Naik, 2000). In the context of our model, these initial investors are fully captured by the238
fund manager and represent the monopolist portion (of size 1 − θ) of the capital market.16239
However, the majority of hedge funds are not closed to new investors for a significant amount240
of time after creation. This means that the fund manager will continue to compete to raise241
additional capital either from the fund’s existing investors or from new investors. Available242
(or not yet committed) capital represents the competitive portion (of size θ) of the capital243
market.17244
Second, because of data limitations, there is little empirical evidence of how and why245
hedge fund managers communicate. The relevant literature typically does not observe com-246
munication but infers it from the observation of correlated trading behavior. However, some247
of it is suggestive of managers collaborating in the manner we describe. For instance, Hong,248
Kubik, and Stein (2004) argue that stock-market participation is strongly influenced by so-249
cial interaction. They further show that individual investors are more likely to participate250
16Even for funds that do not lock in capital, it is quite common to invest in relatively illiquid assets to
form what are called “side pockets” (McCrary, 2002:192). These are pockets of capital that are frozen by
managers so that redemptions do not force the inefficient early liquidation of assets. Ben-David, Franzoni,
and Moussawi (2012) argue that there is significant evidence that this happens increasingly often during
liquidity crises.
17Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) formally model the hedge fund relationship and argue that there
may be decreasing returns to scale for capital within the structure of a hedge fund. They show empirically
that large hedge funds have relatively small or even negative fund flows, while small funds have positive
flows.
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in the stock market when more of their peers also participate. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy251
(2008) extend this basic idea and claim that social networks may be important mechanisms252
through which asset prices incorporate private information. Their findings suggest that fund253
managers and corporate board members from the same university cohort use these contacts254
to pass private information from board to fund. Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2015) show255
that managers who live in the same neighborhood have significantly higher overlap in their256
portfolio holdings than managers who live in the same city but are not neighbors. They257
argue that managers who are neighbors have a greater chance of being socially connected.258
This literature provides evidence that salient information flows between members259
of social networks; however, these flows are not directly observable. Crawford, Gray, and260
Kern (forthcoming) analyze a unique dataset from a social network website and do not261
face this problem of unobservable communication. They show that managers share valuable262
information with others within their social network, and posit that these managers do so263
to receive constructive feedback and to attract additional capital flows to the strategies264
they recommend. Their analysis, however, does not control for payoff conflicts between265
fund managers. In other words, they do not know if the communicating fund managers are266
indeed competing for the same pool of potential capital. With our experimental approach,267
we are able to design a market situation that ensures a distributional conflict between fund268
managers.269
Third, our assumption that communication ends when a new idea is not shared (be-270
cause of a lack of ability or intention) is a strong but not a critical assumption. Numerous271
authors have provided more detailed models of communication in financial markets. The272
modeled tradeoffs, however, are similar to the one in our reduced form view of communi-273
cation. For example, Andrei and Cujean (2015), who extend an information percolation274
model developed in Duffie and Manso (2007), find that communication accelerates informa-275
tion flows and generates momentum in asset prices. They show that “[a]gents who have little276
information rely more on public information broadcast through prices,” whereas “agents who277
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gather large amounts of information through random meetings build a strong knowledge of278
the market and find it optimal to be contrarians and bet against the market.” Manela (2014)279
also models information diffusion in a way that can motivate competitive cooperation sim-280
ilar to our model. He shows that faster-diffusing information (i.e., more sharing) decreases281
the noise in returns but also increases competition for those profits. In this way, there is282
a trade-off between sharing information in order to impound this information into profits,283
and not over-sharing because this will eventually begin to erode profits as prices begin to284
accurately reflect this new information—a trade-off that parallels the tradeoff in our own285
model.286
4 Design and Hypotheses287
4.1 Experimental Design288
We conducted the computerized experiments at the Center and Laboratory for Behavioral289
Operations and Economics (CLBOE) at the University of Texas at Dallas. The participants290
were registered with CLBOE and were drawn from a pool of both undergraduate and grad-291
uate students. We had 100 subjects who participated across four different treatments. All292
subjects participated in only one treatment. Each session lasted anywhere from 80 minutes293
to 120 minutes, depending on the treatment. The average payment was $19.30, ranging from294
$10 to $30.18 Subjects in longer sessions generally had greater earnings.295
The number of subjects ranged from 24 to 28 in each session. We randomly divided the296
subjects into two groups of equal size, with an even number of subjects in each group. Group297
membership was anonymous, meaning that subjects did not know who else was assigned to298
a particular group. They were informed that they had been randomly assigned to a group299
18These figures include a show-up bonus of $5 and average payoffs of $2.5 from a Holt and Laury (2002)
risk preference task.
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of given size and throughout the experiment would be matched only with people from the300
same group.301
Each session was divided into two parts: The first part consisted of a Holt-Laury risk302
preference task (Holt and Laury, 2002), and the second part consisted of our main experi-303
ment. We conducted the Holt-Laury risk preference task via paper and dice before the main304
experiment. The main experiment was programmed and executed via zTree (Fischbacher,305
2007). The outcomes of the lottery in the Holt-Laury risk preference task and the respective306
payoffs were revealed after the computerized experiment at the end of the session. Subjects307
were provided with detailed printed instructions for both the Holt-Laury task and the com-308
puterized experiment, and a short quiz was conducted after the instructions had been read309
out by the experimenter.19310
In the computerized experiment, at the beginning of each period, subjects are ran-311
domly matched into pairs without replacement. After the matches have been determined,312
the subjects in each match are randomly assigned the roles of FM A and FM B. As depicted313
in Figure 1, FM A begins play and is followed by FM B. In each round t ≥ 1 of a match, after314
having generated a new idea (with probability pi), FM i takes two actions. First, we survey315
FM i’s subjective expectations σ˜j.20 We do so by asking FM i to report her expectation316
(between 0% and 100%) that FM j will decide to share an idea in the next round (provided317
that FM j will have generated a new idea).21 Second, the FM decides whether to share or318
conceal the idea.319
On their decision screens, subjects see their assigned role (FM A or FM B) and320
payoffs (for both FMs) for the current round and the subsequent two rounds, for all possible321
19For the instructions of the word-of-mouth communication game, we use the fund-manager narrative from
Section 2.
20For all odd rounds, we obtain FM A’s expectations σ˜B = E(σB); for even rounds, we obtain FM B’s
expectations σ˜A = E(σA).
21We use the following wording: “If, in the next round, the other fund manager successfully generates a
new idea (i.e., “chance” does not terminate the match), how likely do you think the other fund manager will
share this newly generated idea with you?”
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outcomes.22 Recall from the description of the game structure in Figure 1 that, if FM i in322
round t decides to share an idea, the match continues. In our computerized experiment, FM323
j will see the decision screen in round t + 1 (provided she has generated a new idea with324
probability pj). If instead, FM i decides to conceal the idea, the match is terminated. After325
all matches have been terminated, the subjects observe their payoffs from the current match326
and their accumulated payoffs from all previous matches.23 This concludes a match. The327
subjects are then rematched within their respective group, and a new game is played.328
We would like to emphasize the following two design considerations. First, this ex-329
periment consists of a repeated one-shot game of indeterminate horizon. The game ends if330
one of the FMs either fails to generate a new idea or conceals an idea; thus, we do not force331
a match to end prematurely.24 Second, we incentivize the formation but not the reporting332
of subjective expectations σ˜j.25 Because FM j’s future actions have a direct effect on FM i’s333
payoffs, FM i’s expected payoffs increase in the accuracy of her subjective expectations σ˜j.334
This means that for FM i, the formation of these subjective expectations is fully incentivized335
within the game itself. While our approach of surveying subjects’ expectations about their336
match partners’ next-round behavior does not provide incentives for truthful reporting of337
these expectations, we are confident that, on average, expectations are reported truthfully,338
albeit with more noise.26339
22In the printed instructions for the experiment, we provide a table with FM A’s and FM B’s payoffs for
the first 14 rounds for all possible paths of termination of a match.
23From the current match’s payoffs, FM i is able to infer whether its match has been terminated by chance
(FM j failed to generate a new idea) or by choice (FM j decided to conceal a new idea). We make this point
explicit in the printed instructions.
24See Aghion, Bechtold, Cassar, and Herz (2014) for a similar implementation of an indeterminate hori-
zon game. Unlike for laboratory implementations of infinitely repeated games that introduce probabilistic
termination (see, e.g., Roth and Murnighan, 1978; Engle-Warnick and Slonim, 2006; Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette,
2011; Fre´chette and Yuksel, 2013), we do not need to make such adjustments because a move by chance is
a central feature of this game.
25A similar approach is chosen, for instance, in Cohn, Engelmann, Fehr, and Mare´chal (2015). We do not
provide incentives in eliciting subjective expectations for practical reasons: incentivizing FM i through, for
instance, a scoring rule with higher payments for lower linear, logarithmic, or squared difference between
the stated expectations and FM j’s actual decision is not practical when the game is terminated by chance
before it is FM j’s turn to share or conceal (so that no decision by FM j is observed).
26Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2015) find that introspective beliefs (or, as in our case, “subjective
expectations”) are no less accurate or additive than incentive-elicited beliefs. Their study supports the
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Table 1: Calibration and Treatments
This table summarizes the calibration for our computerized experiment with
v(n) = µ (1 − βn), µ = 400, β = 3/4, and θ = 3/8. The conditions for φi,
i = A,B, are for σ˜j = 1.
pB = 90% pB = 50%
pA = 90% High High-Low
(φi ≫ 0) (φi > 0∀i)
pA = 50% Low-High Low
(φi > 0∀i) (φi = 0)
4.2 Model Calibration340
We implement the game depicted in Figure 1 with the realized payoffs in (2) with v(n) =341
µ (1 − βn). We set µ = 400, β = 3/4, and θ = 3/8 but vary the success probabilities pA and pB,342
assigning values pi ∈ {50%,90%}. We summarize the calibrations for the four treatments of343
the experiment in Table 1.344
For treatment High we assume symmetric success probabilities pA = pB = p = 90%;345
for treatment Low, the symmetric success probabilities are pA = pB = p = 90%. We indicate346
a strong incentive to share in treatment High by a relatively large theoretical value for the347
expected net payoffs from sharing, φi ≫ 0. In treatment Low, the sharing condition in348
equation (7) holds with equality.349
For treatments Low-High and High-Low, we assume asymmetric success proba-350
bilities. In treatment Low-High, FM A has a low success probability (pA = 50%), whereas351
FM B has a high success probability (pB = 90%). In treatment High-Low, these numbers352
are reversed. In both treatments, the theoretical values for the expected net payoffs from353
sharing in equation (7) are positive.354
notion that introspection is a valid method to measure subjective beliefs. See Palfrey and Wang (2009) for
a broad set of related results.
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4.3 Hypotheses355
We derive our hypotheses from the theoretical results for our model of communication in356
Proposition 1. The main implication of the model is that FMs are more willing and more357
likely to share private information (i.e., ideas) when they expect feedback from rival FMs.358
Because this feedback depends on both the rival FM’s ability and her expected intentions, we359
design our experiment to allow us to separate the effects of ability from those of intentions.360
This yields the following two hypotheses:361
Hypothesis 1. FM i’s willingness to share (and likelihood of sharing) an idea increases in362
FM j’s cross-success probability pj.363
Hypothesis 2. FM i’s willingness to share (and likelihood of sharing) an idea increases in364
her subjective expectations σ˜j that FM j will share a new idea in the subsequent round.365
Hypothesis 1 relates to the effect of a rival FM’s success probability on one’s own366
willingness to share. A similar positive effect on sharing stems from an FM’s own success367
probability. This effect is two-pronged. First, a higher success probability pi allows FM i to368
generate more ideas in t+ 2, t+ 4, . . . , and share these respective ideas with FM j to receive369
feedback in t + 3, t + 5, . . . . For a given feedback probability pij, the success probability370
pi increases FM i’s expected payoffs EUi(share@t) from sharing in equation (5) while not371
affecting her payoffs Ui(conceal@t) from concealing in equation (3). Second, if, as formally372
shown in Proposition 1 and hypothesized in Hypothesis 1, a higher cross-success probability373
pj increases FM i’s willingness to share an idea, then the reverse ought to hold true: a higher374
own-success probability pi increases FM j’s willingness to share. This, in return, increases375
FM i’s expectations σ˜j that FM j shares new ideas in future rounds. In summary, an FM376
i’s own-success probability has a positive direct effect and a positive indirect effect (through377
subjective expectations σ˜j) on her willingness and likelihood to share.378
Hypothesis 3. FM i’s willingness to share (and likelihood of sharing) an idea increases in379
her own-success probability pi.380
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The last result in Proposition 1 states that, when holding expectations σ˜j constant,381
the effect of FM j’s cross-success probability on FM i’s willingness to share an idea is stronger382
than FM i’s own-success probability. This latter effect is the direct effect of pi, whereas the383
indirect effect is zero because σ˜j is held constant.384
Hypothesis 4. Holding expectations σ˜j constant, the effect of the cross-success probability385
pj on FM i’s willingness to share (and likelihood of sharing) an idea is stronger than the386
direct effect of the own-success probability pi.387
5 Experimental Results388
We first provide descriptive statistics before presenting our main results from multivariate389
regressions.27 Our main results suggest that, for an FM’s decision to share information, the390
expected intentions of rival FMs play a more important role than the rival FM’s ability. In391
the latter part of this section, we study how the FMs’ past experience in the experiment392
(i.e., the dynamics of the experiment) affects their decisions. We close this section with a393
look into the determining factors of an FM’s subjective expectations.394
5.1 Descriptive Statistics395
Table 2 presents basic descriptive statistics for the treatments of the computerized experi-396
ment. We report the total number of subjects and matches for each treatment, the average397
duration of each match, and the average earnings (per match) for each subject. In the bot-398
tom portion of the table, we provide information on how the matches in each treatment were399
terminated (either by chance or by choice) and on how FMs expected their rivals to behave.400
The aggregate figures in Table 2 allow for some preliminary observations. First, the401
percentage of matches terminated by choice (by either FM A or FM B) varies greatly across402
treatment and are in line with our hypotheses. Per Hypothesis 1, FM A is more likely403
27We provide results from simple means tests in the Online Appendix.
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to share, and therefore less likely to terminate (by choice), in treatments with high pB.404
We observe this by comparing Low-High with Low (25% < 40%) as well as High with405
High-Low (21% < 38%). Similarly, per Hypothesis 3, FM A is more likely to share and406
therefore less likely to terminate in treatments with high pA. We observe this by comparing407
High-Low with Low (38% < 40%) as well as High with Low-High (21% < 25%). These408
numbers suggest that the cross-success probability pB plays a more important role than409
the own-success probability pA (Hypothesis 4). We see more direct evidence of this when410
comparing the fraction of matches terminated by FM A in treatment High-Low relative411
to treatment Low-High. High-Low, with pB < pA, exhibits shorter matches, and a larger412
fraction of those matches are terminated by FM A than in treatment Low-High where413
pB > pA.414
Second, matches in treatments with a higher average success probability exhibit a415
longer duration (High compared to Low-High and High-Low; Low-High and High-416
Low compared to Low). The reason for this is both mechanic and behavioral. The expected417
duration of word-of-mouth communication is 1 + σApB1−σAσBpApB .28 Holding σi constant, higher418
success probabilities (by either FM A or FM B) mechanically increase the duration of a419
match. However, higher success probabilities are also likely to increase the values of σi. A420
comparison of the FMs’ expectations about their match partners to share a new idea in the421
next round in treatments High and Low illustrates this. As a consequence, higher success422
probabilities also behaviorally increase the duration of a match.423
In panel (a) of Figure 3, we plot the mean of sharing by FM A in Round 1 of each424
match. We further report the theoretical net benefits from sharing (i.e., φA) for FM A in425
Round 1 across the four treatments. Our model predicts more sharing by FM A when her426
incentives to share are stronger (i.e., when φA is higher). We report simple means tests427
results in the table and confirm this for all but the last treatment effect. In panel (b) of428
Figure 3, we provide box plots of FM A’s expectations σ˜B in Round 1 that FM B will share429
28We derive the expected duration of word-of-mouth communication in the Online Appendix.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
This table provides basic summary statistics for the four main treatments of the experiment (High, Low,
Low-High, and High-Low) as summarized in Table 1. All treatments were conducted in one session with two
groups of equal size sg . For the calibration of the treatments, see Table 1. We list the number of subjects per
treatment; the number of matches (i.e., the number of pair-wise word-of-mouth communications, sg (1 − sg));
the average number of rounds each match proceeds; the average earnings per match (in $) for each subject;
and the percentage of matches terminated by chance (when either FM A or FM B has failed to generate a
new idea), by FM A in an odd round, or by FM B in an even round. Because a match is terminated by either
chance or by choice, these percentages sum up to 100% (with rounding errors).
Treatment
Low- High-
High Low High Low
Subjects 24 28 24 24
Matches 132 182 132 132
Average # of rounds (and decisions by a FM) 5.62 1.43 2.60 1.70
Average earnings (in $) per match . . .
. . . for all subjects 1.57 0.75 1.16 0.83
. . . for FM A 1.58 0.91 1.19 0.98
. . . for FM B 1.56 0.59 1.13 0.67
Percentage of matches terminated by chance . . .
. . . b/c FM A has failed 26.5% 37.4% 8.3% 47.0%
. . . b/c FM B has failed 27.3% 10.4% 45.5% 4.5%
Percentage of matches terminated by choice . . .
. . . by FM A 21.2% 40.6% 25.0% 38.6%
. . . by FM B 25.0% 11.5% 21.2% 9.8%
Subjective expectations σ˜j . . .
. . . by FM A (reported σ˜B) 82.4% 56.1% 59.7% 50.9%
. . . by FM B (reported σ˜A) 78.7% 59.8% 56.4% 64.1%
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Figure 3: Sharing and Expectations in Round 1
This figure plots the average level of sharing in Round 1 by FM A (panel (a)) as well as FM A’s expectations σ˜B in Round 1 (panel
(b)) for all four treatments. In panel (a), the (theoretical) expected net benefits from sharing, φi, as defined in equation (7)
for i = A,B and σ˜j = 1 are provided. The table below reports the results of one-tailed unpaired two-sample t-tests of the pair-
wise difference of the mean of sharing in Round 1 by FM A. The prediction is a positive average treatment effect on sharing
for treatments with higher φA relative to lower φA. We rank treatments by their respective value of φA and predict that
mean(High) > mean(Low-High), mean(Low-High) > mean(High-Low), and mean(High-Low) > mean(Low). The respective
values are reported in brackets. We report the average treatment effects with standard errors in parentheses.
Prediction Average treatment effect
on sharing (s.e.)
Sharing (Round 1) in High [0.8939] > Sharing (Round 1) in Low-High [0.8106] 0.0833∗∗ (0.043)
Sharing (Round 1) in Low-High [0.8106] > Sharing (Round 1) in High-Low [0.6287] 0.1818∗∗∗ (0.054)
Sharing (Round 1) in High-Low [0.6287] > Sharing (Round 1) in Low [0.5934] 0.0353 (0.055)



































































































(b) Expectations in Round 1
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a new idea in Round 2. The mean values are provided; the horizontal lines inside the boxes430
indicate the median. For these figures (and the main results in the next section), we restrict431
our data to FM A’s behavior in Round 1 of each match. The reason for this is that FM A’s432
information from t = 1 is not affected by the history of that respective match. In other words,433
we do not have to control for FM A’s updating of beliefs about FM B’s future actions within434
a given match, because FM A does not observe any earlier actions by FM B in Round 1.435
5.2 Results for Ability and Intentions436
In Table 3, we present regression results from probit models. The dependent variable is a437
dummy variable equal to 1 if FM A shares in Round 1, and equal to 0 if FM A does not438
share the idea in Round 1. We highlight four results from this table. First, FM A is more439
likely to share an idea when she has a higher expectation of feedback. The marginal effects of440
the cross-success probability pB and of her subjective expectations σ˜B (about FM B’s future441
actions) are positive and significant (p < 0.01)—results which support our Hypotheses 1 and442
2. The marginal effects reported in Table 3 imply that FM A is 3.4% to 6.1% more likely443
to share an idea in Round 1 in response to a 10 percentage point increase in the cross-444
probability pB. Moreover, she is 5.6% to 6.3% more likely to share in Round 1 in response445
to a 10 percentage point increase in her expectations σ˜B that FM B will share an idea in446
Round 2.29447
As laid out in the model section, for an FM, expecting to receive feedback depends448
on both the other FM’s ability (captured by success probability pj) and intentions (captured449
by an FM’s expectations σ˜j). Theoretically, any combination of pj and σ˜j induces the450
same behavior as long as pij ≡ pjσ˜j remains constant.30 This implies that the predicted451
probabilities of sharing by FM A ought to be constant for different values of pB and σ˜B452
29The standard deviations of pB and σ˜B across all treatments are 19.9 and 30.1. A one-standard deviation
increase in the other FM’s success probability increases FM A’s probability of sharing by 6.8% to 12.1%.
A one-standard deviation increase of FM A’s expectations σ˜B increase her probability to share an idea in
Round 1 by 16.8% to 19.0%.
30We see this from the expected utility of sharing in equation (5) that can be rewritten as a function of pi
and pij : EUi(share@t) = (1 − θ)∑∞q=0 (pipij)q [ (1 − pij) v(t + 2q) + pij (1 − pi) v(t + 1 + 2q)].
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Table 3: Probit Regression Results for the Effects of Ability and Intentions
We report probit results for all four treatments. The dependent variable is a dummy variable = 1 if FM A
shares in Round 1, and = 0 otherwise. FM A’s expectations of receiving feedback are captured by Cross
success: pB (FM B’s cross success probability) and Expected intentions: σ˜B (FM A’s expectations that FM
B will share in Round 2). Own success: pA is FM A’s own success probability. The number of observations
is the number of Round 1 decisions by FM A. Reported marginal effects are average marginal effects. We
report standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable = 1 if FM A shares in Round 1 and = 0 otherwise
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
ME ME ME ME ME
Cross success: pB 0.0034
∗∗∗ 0.0061∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Expected intentions: σ˜B 0.0056
∗∗∗ 0.0063∗∗∗ 0.0056∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Own success: pA 0.0015
∗ 0.0014∗
(0.0009) (0.0008)
Observations 578 578 578 578 578
pseudo R2 0.2256 0.0645 0.2008 0.0685 0.2299
Log-likelihood -265.54 -320.78 -274.02 -319.38 -264.05∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
such that piB is constant. Figure 4 plots predicted probabilities against pB, keeping pA and453
piB = pBσ˜B constant (at their sample means, with p¯iB = mean(pB)×mean(σ˜B)). Empirically,454
we can reject the null that the predicted values are constant. We therefore do not find455
conclusive evidence that the source of feedback is irrelevant. In other words, while ability and456
intentions are, theoretically, perfect substitutes, we do not find this result of substitutability457
when considering subjects’ behavior. The results in Table 3 explain the downward sloping458
predicted values in Figure 4. If the effect of ability (through pB) and intentions (through459
σ˜B) were the same, then the effect of an increase in pB would be just offset by a decrease in460
σ˜B (to keep piB constant). Because the effect of intention is stronger, the negative effect of461
a decrease in σ˜B more than outweighs the positive effect of the increase in pB, resulting in462
a weaker incentive for FM A to share—the predicted probability decreases. Table 4 shows463
the marginal effects of ability and intentions when evaluated at different combinations of pB464
and σ˜B such that piB = p¯iB. The absence of empirical substitutability therefore prevails.465
Second, FM A is more likely to share an idea in Round 1 when she expects to be466
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Figure 4: Are Ability and Intentions Substitutes?
This figure presents the predicted probability of sharing by FM A in Round 1. We predict probabilities at the the mean value
of pA and varying values of pB and σ˜B , keeping piB = pB σ˜B constant at p¯iB = mean(pB) × mean(σ˜B) (i.e., the sample mean
probability of feedback). The thick dotted line at 41.44% indicates the lower bound of pB (with σ˜B = 100% so that piB = p¯iB).
The shaded area constitutes the 95% confidence band. In panel (a), we employ the specification in model (V) of Table 3. We
conduct a Wald test and (1) reject the null hypothesis (p < 0.01) that predicted probabilities are the same at their extreme
values (for pB = 0.43 and pB = 0.80, and their respective values of σ˜B); (2) reject the null hypothesis (p < 0.05) that predicted
probabilities are the same at the 25th and 75th percentile for σ˜B (and the respective values of pB). In panel (b), we employ the
extended specification in model (XXV) in Table 7. We conduct a Wald test and (1) reject the null hypothesis (p < 0.05) that
predicted probabilities are the same at their extreme values; (2) cannot reject the null hypothesis (at 10% level) that predicted
probabilities are the same at the 25th and 75th percentile for σ˜B .





















































Table 4: Interaction Results for the Effects of Ability and Interactions
We report probit results for all four treatments. The dependent variable is a dummy variable= 1 if FM A shares in Round 1, and = 0 otherwise. FM A’s expectations of receiving feedback are
captured by Cross pB (FM B’s cross success probability) and Expect. σ˜B (FM A’s expectations
that FM B will share in Round 2). Own pA is FM A’s own success probability. Marginal effects
(ME) for model (V) in Table 3 are evaluated at values of pB and σ˜B , keeping piB = pB σ˜B
constant at p¯iB = mean(pB) ×mean(σ˜B) (i.e., the sample mean probability of feedback); pA is
at the sample mean. The number of observations is 578; the pseudo R2 is 0.2299. We report
standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable = 1 if FM A shares
in Round 1 and = 0 otherwise
ME evaluated at ME evaluated at ME evaluated at
pB = 50% pB = 75% pB = 100%
σ˜B = p¯iB/pB σ˜B = p¯iB/pB σ˜B = p¯iB/pB
Cross success: pB 0.0033
∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0041∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0007)
Expected intentions: σ˜B 0.0054
∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗ 0.0066∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0011)
Own success: pA 0.0014
∗ 0.0017∗ 0.0017∗
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Test of the difference in coefficients : χ2
pB − σ˜B = 0 5.62∗∗ 3.74∗ 2.92∗
(0.0178) (0.0533) (0.0874)∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
26
successful in generating yet another idea in Round 3. The marginal effect of own-success467
probability pA is positive and significant (p < 0.10)—a result which supports Hypothesis 3.468
The marginal effects imply that FM A is 1.4% to 1.5% more likely to share an idea in Round469
1 in response to a 10 percentage point increase in her own-success probability.31 Observe470
that the marginal effect of pA in model (IV) is the overall effect, whereas the effect of pA in471
model (V), which controls for expected intentions σ˜B, is the direct effect only. A comparison472
of these two suggests that, if there is an indirect effect of pA on FM A’s sharing, which473
operates through FM A’s expectations of B’s intentions, then this effect is, at best, small.474
Third, in Hypothesis 4 we posit that, when holding expected intentions σ˜B constant,475
the effect of cross-success pB is stronger than of own-success pA. We observe that the marginal476
effects of pB are greater than those of pA in all specifications. To confirm, we perform a Wald477
test, which rejects the null that the two effects are the same.32478
Fourth, measured by the size of the marginal effect, the effect of expectations is479
stronger than the effect of either pA or pB. A Wald test rejects the null that the effect of480
expectations is the same as the effect of pA or pB.33 This means that expectations about481
the other FM’s intentions to give feedback in the next round seem to matter more than the482
other FM’s ability to give feedback. This result is indicative of—but does not necessarily483
imply—the importance of the strength of links in a social network (proxied by the intentions484
of a given link) relative to the number of links (proxied by the ability of the average link).34485
To summarize, the expected intentions of FM B have a greater impact on FM A’s486
decision to share information than FM B’s ability. This behavior is despite the theoretical487
equivalence—of ability and intentions—that is a result in our model. We see this from488
31The standard deviation of pA is 19.9, so that a one-standard deviation increase in her own-success
probability increases FM A’s probability of sharing in Round 1 by roughly 3%.
32In model (IV), equality of the coefficients for pB and pA (the overall effect of pA) can be rejected at
the 10% level; in model (V), equality of the coefficients for pB and pA (the direct effect of pA because σ˜B is
controlled for) can be rejected at the 1% level.
33In model (V), equality of the coefficients for σ˜B and pA can be rejected at the 5% level; equality of the
coefficients for σ˜B and pB can be rejected at the 1% level.
34An FM with strong links is more likely to expect another FM to respond with a generated idea (higher
σ˜B). An FM with more links (i.e., more than one FM B) is more likely to face another FM who is able to
generate a new idea (higher pB).
27
the marginal effects in Table 3, as well as the decreasing predicted probability in Figure 4.489
Moreover, an FM’s own ability has a positive effect on her likelihood and willingness to490
share. We do not, however, find strong evidence of higher order beliefs in how one’s own491
ability affects future behavior. The indirect effect pA has on FM A’s sharing (through the492
expected intentions of FM B) seems to be, at best, weak. In other words, an FM A with493
higher ability is not more likely, and willing, to share because she believes FM B is more494
likely and willing to share in the next round in response to a higher pA.495
5.3 The Effect of Past Experience496
In Table 5, we provide results concerning the effect of an FM’s past experience across matches.497
We use model (V) from Table 3 and consider the effect of two dummy variables. Other498
Terminated is equal to 1 if FM A had a match partner (either as FM A or FM B) in a499
previous match who terminated that specific match by choice. Likewise, Own Terminated500
is equal to 1 if FM A terminated a previous match by choice, either as FM A or FM B. In501
models (IX) through (XIV) we use the subsample of FMs A who vary their decision across502
matches, that means, who do not exhibit match-invariant decisions. We find that the effects503
of our feedback variables pB and σ˜B, as well as pA, are robust in models (VI), (VII), and504
(VIII) (i.e., the full sample) to the inclusion of past experience.505
The effects of Other Terminated and Own Terminated suggest that past experience506
has an impact on FM A’s decision to share. For example, in model (VI), if FM A in an507
earlier match faced another FM who terminated the match by concealing an idea (Other508
Terminated), then FM A is in Round 1 of the given match 8.4 percentage points less likely509
to share than otherwise.35 The results for Other Terminated are consistent with notions of510
awareness and revision of prior beliefs about a match partner’s “type.” At the beginning of511
each match, two FMs are randomly re-matched (from within each group) without replace-512
35The unconditional mean of FM A sharing in Round 1 is 72.0% (for the full sample) and 57.4% (for the
sample with match-variant behavior in models (IX) through (XIV)). The effect of Other Terminated in the
models with the reduced sample is stronger because the sample includes only FM As who have changed




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ment, and at the beginning of each match, a FM forms her prior beliefs about the other513
FM’s intentions. Because in Table 5 the dependent variable reflects the first decision of a514
new match, there is no scope for updating these prior beliefs about the other FM’s type515
within a given match. FM A being more aware or cautious (resulting in lower expectations)516
explains the negative effect of Other Terminated.517
In model (VII), if an FM A herself terminated by choice in an earlier match, then518
FM A is 26.3 percentage points less likely to share in Round 1 of a given match. One519
possible explanation for this result is that an FM’s past action in fact captures the FM’s520
own type and thus her propensity to conceal instead of to share an idea. It is as if an FM521
reveals her own type to herself as soon as she conceals an idea. Models (XII) and (XIV),522
in which we control for subject fixed effects, support this explanation. The effects of Own523
Terminated in the models without the subject fixed effects are stronger than in the models524
with the fixed effects.36 Note that, if Own Terminated were to capture only a subject fixed525
effect, the marginal effects would be nil in these specifications. However, we still obtain526
a significant effect of Own Terminated in model (XIV). A possible explanation for this is527
an FM revising her own prior beliefs about the match partner’s “type” through an effect528
analogous to “self-projection” in which a subject “project[s] her known behavior to guess529
others’ behavior” (Le´vy-Garboua, Meidinger, and Rapoport, 2006:574). For our context,530
this means, that when FM A observes herself concealing an idea, the incentives of sharing531
and concealing become more salient, resulting in less optimistic expectations about FM B’s532
intentions in a given match.533
5.4 Determinants of Subjective Expectations534
In Table 6, we present results detailing the determinants of FM i’s subjective expectations535
in a Round t, concerning FM j’s intentions to share an idea in t + 1. Unlike in our previous536
analyses, we now consider both FM A’s, and FM B’s, expectations in all rounds. This537
36To allow for direct comparison, we use the reduced sample in models (IX), (X), and (XI) without the
subject fixed effects.
30
gives us a total of 1,574 observations (i.e., decisions to share, or conceal, and the reported538
expectations σ˜j). We report the results for tobit models with reported expectations as the539
dependent variable, a left-censoring limit of 0, and a right-censoring limit of 100.540
We make a number of observations. First, for the specifications without subject541
dummies, the positive effect of a rival FM’s success probability on expectations (i.e., the542
effect of FM j’s probability pj on FM i’s expectations) is stronger than the effect of own-543
success probability pA (p < 0.01). Our results in Table 3 suggest that the effect of an FM’s544
own probability of success is weaker than the effect of the other FM’s probability of success,545
and imply that the effect of pj on FM j’s sharing is weaker than the effect of pi. We would546
therefore expect the effect of pj on FM i’s expectations σ˜j to be weaker than the effect of547
pi on σ˜j. Our results do not confirm this intuition, possibly suggesting that the first-order548
effects from Table 3 do not translate into the analogous effects on higher-order beliefs about549
other subjects’ strategies.550
Second, the positive effect of pi on FM i’s expectations comports with our discussion551
of the indirect effect of pi on FM i’s willingness, and likelihood, to share in the context552
of Hypothesis 3. We argued that because pj is expected to increase FM i’s willingness and553
likelihood to share, pi is expected to increase FM j’s willingness and likelihood to share. And554
in return, an increase in pi is expected to increase FM i’s expectations σ˜j that FM j is going555
to share a new idea. However, as discussed in the context of the results of Table 3 (comparing556
the effect of pA in models (IV) and (V)), we do not see this particular higher-order belief to557
translate into FM A’s behavior.558
Third, the effect of the number of rounds played is consistent with updating of beliefs559
about the other FM’s “type” within a match. In other words, given that FM j has shared560
in Round t − 1, FM i updates her beliefs in Round t about the intentions of FM j.37561
37An alternative explanation stems from the payoff structure of the experiment. The further the game of
word-of-mouth communication progresses, the smaller in size are the absolute and relative costs and benefits
of sharing. For instance, in Round 1 the payoff difference for FM A of terminating in the current round as
opposed to in Round 3 is 65.63 (or 65.63%); in Round 7 this difference is 11.68 (or 5.23%); and in Round 11
the difference is 3.7 (or 1.5%). This means, an FM has a weaker incentive to conceal in later rounds than in
earlier rounds.
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Table 6: Determinants of Subjective Expectations
We report the results from tobit models for the determinants of an FM i’s subjective expectations in
t about FM j’s intentions to share in t+ 1 in all treatments. The dependent variable is σ˜j ∈ [0,100]
in a given round t of a match. Cross pj is FM j’s cross-success probability; Own pi is FM i’s own-
success probability; Match is the match number; Round is the round number, t, in a given match;
Other Terminated is a dummy variable = 1 if FM i has previously had a match partner (either as
FM i or FM j) who terminated their match by choice (i.e., concealed an idea), and = 0 otherwise;
Own Terminated is a dummy variable = 1 if FM i has previously terminated a match by choice (i.e.,
concealed an idea) either as FM i or as FM j, and = 0 otherwise; Other × Own Terminated is an
interaction term. Both Other Terminated and Own Terminated are, by definition, = 0 in the very
first match. Subject Dummies indicates whether or not subject dummies are included to control
for subject fixed effects. The number of observations is the total number of decisions by FM i in
all t. The left-censoring limit for the tobit model is 0; the right-censoring limit is 100. We report
standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable: FM i’s subjective expectations σ˜j ∈ [0,100]
in a given round t of a match
(XV) (XVI) (XVII) (XVIII) (XIX)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Cross pj 0.4314
∗∗∗ 0.4236∗∗∗ 0.4263∗∗∗ -0.2115 -0.2579
(0.0443) (0.0434) (0.0437) (0.2405) (0.2401)
Own pi 0.1971
∗∗∗ 0.2062*** 0.2073∗∗∗ -0.3673 -0.4127∗
(0.0453) (0.0443) (0.0443) (0.2404) (0.2400)
Match -0.9082∗∗∗ -0.1166 -0.1013 -0.0887 -0.1612
(0.2391) (0.3451) (0.3464) (0.2936) (0.2934)
Round 1.6110∗∗∗ 1.4826∗∗∗ 1.4833∗∗∗ 0.4001∗∗ 0.4008∗∗
(0.2455) (0.2402) (0.2402) (0.1992) (0.1987)
Other 2.9797 2.1690 -5.7261∗∗ -9.5313∗∗∗
Terminated (2.4343) (2.8949) (2.2560) (2.5397)
Own -15.7139∗∗∗ -17.2368∗∗∗ -0.4291 -8.4098∗∗
Terminated (1.7583) (3.4304) (2.2003) (3.2932)
Other × Own 2.0060 11.7965∗∗∗
Terminated (3.8786) (3.6334)
Subject dummies No No No Yes Yes
Observations 1574 1574 1574 1574 1574
pseudo R2 0.0211 0.0272 0.0272 0.1009 0.1017
Log-likelihood -6420.43 -6380.57 -6380.44 -5896.91 -5891.65
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Fourth, the positive interaction effect in model (XIX) suggests that the two types of562
past experience are not cumulative. The effect of Other Terminated is stronger when FM i563
herself has not terminated an earlier match. Similarly, FM i adjusts her expectations of FM564
j’s behavior downward in response to Own Terminated only if she has not already seen a565
rival FM terminate a match. This result is in line with our earlier discussion of the salience of566
one’s incentives in response to one’s own termination, and the effect arises only if an FM has567
not experienced termination before. Once an FM has faced a rival FM that terminated the568
match by choice, an FM’s own subsequent termination has no effect on her belief formation.569
6 Robustness570
Our results concerning how the probability of feedback (measured by ability and intentions)571
affects sharing are robust to a set variables capturing trust, fairness, and personal connec-572
tions; all of which have been associated with increased cooperative or pro-social behavior.573
We report these results in Table 7 and provide detailed descriptions and summary statistics574
for these control variables in Table A1 in the Appendix.575
Personal Connections: Indicators of personal connections or social bonds (i.e., number576
of people a participant recognizes in the experimental session [Acquaintances] and number of577
people in the session a participant considers friends [Friends]38) do do not affect our results578
for the probability of feedback (pB and σ˜B) or an FM’s own success probability. Moreover,579
only Friends exhibits a statistically significant effect on FM A’s sharing in Round 1.580
A small number of papers have presented results that suggest that social interactions581
and peer effects influence stock market participation (Hong, Kubik, and Stein, 2004) or582
provide a mechanism through which asset prices incorporate private information (Cohen,583
Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008). To understand how personal connections or social bonds affect584
38Recall that by the design of the experiment, subjects did not know with whom they had been grouped.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































word-of-mouth communication, we need to draw a distinction between the effect at the585
extensive margin and at the intensive margin. The former describes how FMs choose to586
form connections or a network with which to share private information (selection). The587
latter captures the effect on the willingness to share when a connection or network has588
already been formed. We find that, given an exchange network (taking the extensive margin589
as given), the presence of personal connections or social bonds plays little to no role in the590
FM’s decision to share an idea. Our results are complementary to Crawford, Gray, and591
Kern (forthcoming), who also take a social network as given and observe word-of-mouth592
communication at the intensive margin.593
Fairness and Trustworthiness: The experimental literature in economics has shown594
that considerations of fairness of others and trust toward others play an important role in595
how people make decisions.39 In order to see the effect of fairness and trust on an FM’s596
decision to share a new idea, we control for two variables obtained in an exit survey. First,597
we survey the participants’ perception of other people’s fairness (Fairness); second, we ask598
for participants’ perception of other people’s trustworthiness (Trustworthiness). These indi-599
cators are meant to capture an FM’s general attitude toward other people in terms of fairness600
and trustworthiness. Again, our main results are robust to the inclusion of these indicators.601
Moreover, subjects’ views of fairness and trustworthiness do not exhibit statistically signifi-602
cant effects on FM A’s sharing in Round 1. We therefore do not find evidence for an effect603
of general perceptions of fairness and trustworthiness of others on an FM’s decision to share604
private information.605
Risk Aversion: We further find that risk aversion does not drive our main results because606
the marginal effects of Risk Aversion on the FM A’s sharing behavior is not statistically607
39For fairness, see, for instance, Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000), or Fehr and Schmidt (2006). In the context of information exchange, Ga¨chter, von
Krogh, and Haeflinger (2010) argue that knowledge sharing in private-collective innovation (i.e., privately
funded public goods innovation) is affected by fairness. For trust, see, for instance, Berg, Dickhaut, and
McCabe (1995) or Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and Boeing (2000).
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significantly different from zero. Our risk-aversion measure we derive from the Holt and608
Laury (2002) risk preference tasks; these numbers are consistent with those in Holt and609
Laury (2002).40 We take a conservative approach, and for our analyses—utilizing the Holt-610
Laury risk preference measure in models (XXV) through (XXVII)—we use only observations611
from matches with subjects making consistent choices.612
7 Concluding Remarks613
Recent empirical results, showing that fund managers in geographical, educational, or social614
networks exhibit correlated trading, have been interpreted as evidence that professional615
investors exchange relevant investment ideas. The collaboration argument in Stein (2008)616
posits that competing fund managers exchange valuable ideas for investment opportunities617
when they expect feedback, that means, receiving more ideas in return. To examine the618
motivations underlying this type of collaboration, we design a laboratory experiment in619
which competing fund managers continually share ideas. We find that managers are more620
willing, and likely, to share when their rival’s ability and intentions to provide feedback are621
high. We further provide evidence that, for a fund manager’s decision to share, subjective622
expectations about rivals’ intentions matter more than objective expectations about their623
ability.624
In our experimental design, we assume that connections between fund managers have625
already been made, eliminating from the fund managers’ action set the decision to join a626
network of information exchange. Moreover, we assume that the fund managers’ abilities are627
common knowledge. Future research should investigate the formation of networks, and how628
the outcomes—which we assume—arise in practice. We expect elements that are central to629
40Most subjects are risk averse and made choices between 5, 6, and 7 in the risk-aversion elicitation task.
This implies risk aversion coefficients of 0.15 and 0.97 in terms of a CARA expected utility framework. Note
that about 22% of the subjects exhibit inconsistent choices (selecting back and forth between lottery A and
lottery B as the probability of the higher payoff increased).
36
many repeated relationships to affect selection into networks and the matching of potential630
collaborators, as well as the dynamics of an information-exchange relationship.631
There are other possible incentive structures that could motivate information shar-632
ing in this manner, and we expect that future research will also examine the motivations633
underlying those alternatives in a similar manner to what we do here. For instance, would634
the awareness argument raised by Dow and Gorton (1994) and Pontiff (2006) be sufficient635
to motivate sharing? Finally, in an environment where both collaboration and awareness are636
possible, which incentive would prove more salient?637
37
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A Additional Figures and Tables811
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Figure A1: FM A’s Subjective Expectations
This figure provides histograms (left scale; bars) and kernel density estimates (right scale; curve) of FM A’s subjective ex-
pectations in Round 1. The percentage numbers indicate the size of three subgroups of expectations: “low” expectations for































































FM A’s Subjective Expectations in Round 1
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Table A1: Definitions and Summary Statistics
Definitions for round-level data
Own success pi FM i’s success probability (i.e., the probability of generating a new idea conditional on
FM j having shared an idea in the previous round). Subjects know their own and their
match partner’s success probability.
Cross success pj FM j’s success probability (i.e., the probability of generating a new idea conditional on
FM i having shared an idea in the previous round). Subjects know their own and their
match partner’s success probability.
Expected intentions σ˜j FM i’s expectations that FM j will share a newly generated idea in the next round.
Round Round number of a given match.
Other Terminated Dummy variable = 1 if FM i has previously had a match partner who terminated the
match by choice (i.e., concealed an idea) either as FM A (in odd rounds) or FM B (in
even rounds). By definition, Other Terminated = 0 for the first match.
Own Terminated Dummy variable = 1 if FM i has previously terminated a match by choice (i.e., concealed
an idea) either as a FM A (in odd rounds) or FM B (in even rounds). By definition,
Own Terminated = 0 for the first match.
Definitions for subject-level data
Acquaintances Number of people each participant recognized in the experimental session (Survey ques-
tion: “How many people in this session do you recognize?”)
Friends Number of a participant’s friends that are participating in the same session (Survey
question: “How many would you consider friends?”)
Fairness Participant’s perception of other people’s fairness with higher values indicating more
fairness (Survey question: “Do you think that most people would try to take ad-
vantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?” This ques-
tion is adapted from the World Values Survey. The questionnaire can be found at
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp.).
Trustworthiness Participant’s perception of other people’s trustworthiness with higher values indicating
higher levels of trust (Survey question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted, or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” This
question is adapted from the World Values Survey. The questionnaire can be found at
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp.).
Risk Aversion Risk aversion category by the Holt and Laury (2002) risk preference task, ranging from
1 to 10 with higher numbers reflecting higher degrees of risk aversion. Risk aversion
results are consistent with the results from Holt and Laury (2002) in that most subjects
are risk averse and choose between 5 (21.3%), 6 (14.9%), and 7 (30.3%) in the risk-
aversion elicitation task. This implies risk aversion coefficients of 0.15 and 0.97 in terms
of a CARA expected utility framework. Subjects that exhibit inconsistent behavior, that
means, that selected back and forth between lottery A and lottery B as the probability
of the higher payoff increased, are dropped from the sample when Holt-Laury is used as
independent variable.
Summary Statistics
N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Own success pi (for Round 1) 578 68.27 19.94 50 90
Cross success pj (for Round 1) 578 68.27 19.94 50 90
Expected intentions σ˜j (for Round 1) 578 60.70 30.10 0 100
Round 1574 3.67 3.77 1 22
Other Terminated 1574 0.72 0.45 0 1
Own Terminated 1574 0.53 0.50 0 1
Acquaintances 100 2.92 2.36 0 12
Friends 100 1.81 2.64 0 12
Fairness 100 4.85 2.36 1 10
Trustworthiness 100 5.45 2.61 1 10
Risk Aversion 82 6.95 1.51 3 10
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1 Tables and Figures20
- In Figure B1, we summarize the fraction of FM A sharing their initial idea in Round21
1 as well as FM A’s expectations σ˜B for three subsamples of matches: matches 1–3,22
matches 4–8, and matches 9 and higher.23
- In Tables B1 and B2, we provide means tests results for our main Hypotheses 1–424
(with regression results in Table 3 in the main text).25
- In Table B3, we provide the main results from Table 3 in the main text for three26
subsamples of matches: matches 1–3, matches 4–8, and matches 9 and higher.27
- In Table B4, we provide the results on the effect of past experience on sharing from28
Table 5 in the main text for two subsamples of matches: matches 1–6 and matches 729
and higher.30
- In Table B5, we provide the results for the determinants of expectations σ˜j in Table 6 in31
the main text for two subsamples of matches: matches 1–6 and matches 7 and higher.32
2
Figure B1: Sharing and Expectations in Round 1 by Match Groups
This figure plots the average level of sharing in Round 1 by FM A (panel (a)) as well as FM A’s expectations σ˜B in Round 1
(panel (b)) for all four treatments (High, Low, Low-High [L-H], and High-Low [H-L]). We provide the graphs for three subsamples
















































































































































































































(f) Expectations in Matches ≥ 9
3
Table B1: Average Treatment Effects (Hypotheses 1, 3, and 4)
In the top portion of the table, we report the average level of sharing in Round 1 by FM A for treatments High, Low,
Low-High, and High-Low. In the bottom portion of the table, we report the results of one-tailed unpaired two-sample
t-tests of the pair-wise difference of the mean of sharing (in Round 1 by FM A) for Hypotheses 1, 3, and 4. We provide
results for the full sample as well as by three groups of FM A’s expectations σ˜B about B’s sharing in Round 2: “Low” for
σ˜B ∈ [0%,33%], “Medium” for σ˜B ∈ (33%,66%], and “High” for σ˜B ∈ (66%,100%]. The prediction is a positive average
treatment effect on sharing (e.g., Sharing (Round 1) in High > Sharing (Round 1) in High-Low). We report the average
treatment effects with standard errors in parentheses.
Sharing in Round 1 (FM A)
Treatment Mean (s.e.) N
High (pA = 90%, pB = 90%) 0.8939 (0.026) 132
Low (pA = 50%, pB = 50%) 0.5934 (0.036) 182
Low-High (pA = 50%, pB = 90%) 0.8106 (0.034) 132
High-Low (pA = 90%, pB = 50%) 0.6287 (0.042) 132
Differences: Unpaired two-sample t-test
Prediction Average treatment effect on sharing (s.e.)
by FM A’s expectations subgroup
Full Low Medium High
Hypothesis 11: Positive effect of cross success probability
High > High-Low 0.2651∗∗∗ -0.0051 0.0631 0.1849∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.145) (0.087) (0.051)
Low-High > Low 0.2171∗∗∗ 0.3882∗∗∗ 0.1247∗ 0.1012∗
(0.051) (0.123) (0.082) (0.061)
Hypothesis 3: Positive effect of own success probability
High > Low-High 0.0833∗ -0.3882∗∗ 0.1209 0.0520∗
(0.043) (0.190) (0.094) (0.036)
High-Low > Low 0.0353 0.0051 0.1825∗∗ -0.0316
(0.055) (0.088) (0.079) (0.082)
Hypothesis 4: Effect of cross success probability is stronger than of own success probability
Low-High > High-Low 0.1818∗∗∗ 0.3831∗∗∗ -0.0578 0.1328∗∗
(0.054) (0.128) (0.077) (0.070)∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4
Table B2: Average Treatment Effects (Hypothesis 2)
We report the results of one-tailed unpaired two-sample t-tests of the pair-wise difference of mean sharing
(in Round 1 by FM A) between different belief groups (“Low”, “Medium”/“Med”, and “High”) treatments
High, Low, Low-High, and High-Low. The three groups of FM A’s beliefs σ˜B about B’s sharing in Round
2 are: “Low” for σ˜B ∈ [0%,33%], “Medium”/“Med” for σ˜B ∈ (33%,66%], and “High” for σ˜B ∈ (66%,100%].
The prediction is a positive average treatment effect on sharing between belief groups (e.g., mean of sharing
in “Med” > mean of sharing in “Low”). We report the average treatment effects (ATE) with standard errors
in parentheses.
Treat- Belief Comparison
ment group Sharing in Round 1 Prediction across expectation groups
Mean (s.e.) N ATE (s.e.)
Low 0.2000 (0.133) 10
High Med 0.8846 (0.063) 26 Med > Low 0.6846∗∗∗ (0.131)
High 0.9687 (0.017) 96 High > Med 0.0841∗∗ (0.047)
Low 0.2000 (0.060) 45
Low Med 0.6388 (0.057) 72 Med > Low 0.4388∗∗∗ (0.086)
High 0.8153 (0.048) 65 High > Med 0.1764∗∗ (0.075)
Low 0.5882 (0.123) 17
Low-High Med 0.7636 (0.057) 55 Med > Low 0.1754∗ (0.124)
High 0.9166 (0.035) 60 High > Med 0.1530∗∗ (0.066)
Low 0.2051 (0.065) 39
High-Low Med 0.8214 (0.051) 56 Med > Low 0.6163∗∗∗ (0.082)
High 0.7837 (0.068) 37 High > Med -0.0376 (0.084)∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
5
Table B3: Effects of Ability and Intentions by Match Groups
We report probit results for all four treatments for three subsamples of matches: 1–3 (early matches), 4–8
(intermediate matches), and 9 and higher (late matches). The dependent variable is a dummy variable = 1 if FM
A shares in Round 1, and = 0 otherwise. FM A’s expectations of receiving feedback are captured by Cross success
(FM B’s cross success probability pB) and Expected intentions (FM A’s expectations σ˜B that FM B will share
in Round 2). Own success is FM A’s own success probability pA. The number of observations is the number of
Round 1 decisions by FM A. Reported marginal effects are average marginal effects. We report standard errors
in parentheses.
Dependent variable = 1 if FM A shares in Round 1 and = 0 o.w.
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Matches 1–3
Cross success -0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013)
Expected intentions 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Own success 0.0011 0.0006
(0.0014) (0.0013)
Observations 150 150 150 150 150
Matches 4–8
Cross success 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0070∗∗∗ 0.0070∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Expected intentions 0.0052∗∗∗ 0.0061∗∗∗ 0.0053∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Own success 0.0003 0.0008
(0.0014) (0.0013)
Observations 250 250 250 250 250
Matches 9 and higher
Cross success 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016)
Expected intentions 0.0058∗∗∗ 0.0069∗∗∗ 0.0057∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0008)
Own success 0.0028 0.0021
(0.0017) (0.0016)





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B5: Determinants of Subjective Expectations by Match Groups
We report the results from tobit models for the determinants of a FM i’s subjective expectations in t about FM j’s intentions
to share in t + 1 in all treatments. The dependent variable is σ˜j ∈ [0,100] in a given round t of a match. Cross pj is FM j’s
cross-success probability; Own pi is FM i’s own-success probability; Match is the match number; Round is the round number,
t, in a given match; Other Terminated is a dummy variable = 1 if FM i has previously had a match partner (either as FM
i or FM j) who terminated their match by choice (i.e., concealed an idea), and = 0 otherwise; Own Terminated is a dummy
variable = 1 if FM i has previously terminated a match by choice (i.e., concealed an idea) either as FM i or as FM j, and = 0
otherwise; Other × Own Terminated is an interaction term. Both Other Terminated and Own Terminated are, by definition,= 0 in the very first match. Subject Dummies indicates whether or not subject dummies are included to control for subject
fixed effects. The number of observations is the total number of decisions by FM i in all t. The left-censoring limit for the
tobit model is 0; the right-censoring limit is 100. We report standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Dependent variable: FM i’s subjective expectations σ˜j ∈ [0,100]
in a given round t of a match
(XV) (XVI) (XVII) (XVIII) (XIX)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Matches 1–6
Cross success 0.3091∗∗∗ 0.3246∗∗∗ 0.3216∗∗∗ -0.5072∗ -0.5405∗∗
(0.0590) (0.0570) (0.0572) (0.2651) (0.2655)
Own success 0.0868 0.1230∗∗ 0.1223∗∗ -0.5266∗∗ -0.5643∗∗
(0.0606) (0.0583) (0.0582) (0.2616) (0.2623)
Round 2.3456∗∗∗ 2.1750∗∗∗ 2.1651∗∗∗ 0.4795∗ 0.4898∗∗
(0.3348) (0.3217) (0.3219) (0.2458) (0.2459)
Other Terminated 3.8012∗ 4.7342∗ -6.8050∗∗∗ -9.1285∗∗∗
(2.1541) (2.6840) (2.0556) (2.4978)
Own Terminated -18.9768∗∗∗ -17.4933∗∗∗ -0.9366 -4.3488
(2.2412) (3.3894) (2.5527) (3.2866)
Other × Own -2.6384 7.0477
Terminated (4.5282) (4.2856)
Observations 824 824 824 824 824
Matches 7 and higher
Cross success 0.5696∗∗∗ 0.5453∗∗∗ 0.5453∗∗∗ 0.1247 0.1247
(0.0662) (0.0661) (0.0661) (0.3279) (0.3279)
Own success 0.3191∗∗∗ 0.3079∗∗∗ 0.3079∗∗∗ -0.1725 -0.1725
(0.0676) (0.0669) (0.0669) (0.3335) (0.3335)
Round 0.7293∗∗ 0.6740∗ 0.6740∗ 0.3341 0.3341
(0.3592) (0.3566) (0.3566) (0.2630) (0.2630)
Other Terminated 1.9123 1.9123 -3.2359 -3.2359
(7.7722) (7.7722) (10.5794) (10.5794)
Own Terminated -11.3394∗∗∗ -11.3394∗∗∗ -5.0646 -5.0646
(2.6640) (2.6640) (5.0524) (5.0524)
Other × Own 0.0000 0.0000
Terminated (.) (.)
Observations 750 750 750 750 750
Subject dummies No No No Yes Yes
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2 Additional Model Results33
In this section we provide addition results for the asymmetric version of the word-of-mouth34
communication model (Stein, 2008) used in the main text.35
2.1 Expected Duration36
The communication continues for an indeterminate number of rounds. The expected duration37
of this game is finite as long as one of the FMs fails to generate a new idea, or decides to38
conceal a new idea, with strictly positive probability. Figure B2 reproduces the Figure with39
the timeline for the model from the main text.40
Figure B2: Timeline of Word-of-Mouth Communication




























For the derivations of the expected duration, suppose the FMs play time-invariant41
strategies, and let σi denote a mixed strategy played by a FM i, where σi = Pr(share) and42
1 − σi = Pr(conceal) in all t ≥ 1.43
Lemma B1. The expected duration of word-of-mouth communication is44
1 + σApB
1 − σAσBpApB
and finite if σi and pi such that σAσBpApB < 1. The effect of pB on this expected duration is45
stronger than the effect of pA if and only if σi and pB such that σAσBpB < 1.46
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Proof. To determine the expected duration of communication, we determine the probabilities47
δt that the game ends in a stage t (as depicted in Figure B2). Recall that σi is FM i’s strategy48
with σi = Pr(share) and 1 − σi = Pr(conceal).49
- The game ends in Round 1 when (i) FM A conceals or (ii) when FM A shares and FM50
B fails. The probability of (i) or (ii) is51
δ1 = 1 − σA + σA (1 − pB) = 1 − σApB.
- The game ends in Round 2 when (i) FM A shares, FM B is successful, and FM B52
conceals; or (ii) FM A shares, FM B is successful, FM B shares, and FM A fails. The53
probability of (i) or (ii) is54
δ2 = σApB (1 − σB) + σApBσB (1 − pA)= σApB (1 − σBpA) .
- The game ends in Round 3 when (i) FM A shares, FM B is successful, FM B shares,55
FM A is successful, and FM A conceals; or (ii) FM A shares, FM B is successful, FM56
B shares, FM A is successful, FM A shares, and FM B fails. The probability of (i) or57
(ii) is58
δ3 = σApBσBpA (1 − σA) + σApBσBpAσA (1 − pB)= σApBσBpA (1 − σApB) .
- The probability that the game ends in Round 4 is δ4 = (σApB)2 σBpA (1 − σBpA); the59
probability that the game ends in Round 5 is δ5 = (σApB)2 (σBpA)2 (1 − σApB); the60
probability that the game ends in Round 6 is δ6 = (σApB)3 (σBpA)2 (1 − σBpA); the61
probability that the game ends in Round 7 is δ7 = (σApB)3 (σBpA)3 (1 − σApB); and so62
forth.63
The expected duration of word-of-mouth communication (i.e., the expected round in which64
it ends) is65
D = ∞∑
q=0 δq+1 (q + 1)= ∞∑
q=0 (σApB)q (σBpA)q [(1 − σApB) (1 + q) + σApB (1 − σBpA) (2 + q)]= 1 + σApB
1 − σAσBpApB . (B1)
The derivative of the last expression, D, with respect to pA is66
∂D
∂pA
= p2Bσ2AσB(1 − σAσBpApB)2 > 0
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The derivative of D with respect to pB is67
∂D
∂pB






⇐⇒ σAσBp2B < 1, (B2)
implying that the effect of FM B’s success probability is stronger than FM A’s success69
probability if and only if σi and pi such that σAσBpB < 1 Q.E.D.70
Lemma B1 implies that FM B’s (i.e., the follower’s) success probability has a larger71
impact on the duration of communication than FM A’s (i.e., the leader whose initial idea is72
taken as a given).73
2.2 Expected Payoffs from Sharing an Idea74
Below, we provide more details on how FM i’s expected payoffs from sharing a newly gen-75
erated idea in t in expression (5) in the main text are generated:76
Lemma B2. FM i’s expected payoffs from sharing a newly generated idea in t are:77
EUi(share@t) = (1 − θ) ∞∑
q=0 (pipjσ˜j)q [ (1 − pjσ˜j) v(t + 2q) + pjσ˜j (1 − pi) v(t + 1 + 2q)].
Proof. First, note that in period t, FM i holds ni = t. We construct the payoffs by determining78
the probabilities that FM i has exactly ni = t + q ideas for q = 0, . . . ,∞. With t + q ideas79
FM i’s payoffs are v(t + q) in its own Segment i and max{v(t + q) − v(t + q − 1),0} in the80
competitive Segment C. We assume that once FM i chooses to share in t, she shares in all81
future t′ > t. Hence, σi = 1.82
- When FM i shares an idea in t, both FMs have t ideas and FM i’s payoffs are (1 − θ) v(t)83
with probability 1− pjσ˜j, that is, the probability that (i) FM j fails to generate a new84
idea in t + 1 (probability 1 − pj); or (ii) FM j generates a new idea but conceals it in85
t + 1 (probability pj (1 − σ˜j)).86
- Both FMs have t + 1 ideas and FM i’s payoffs are (1 − θ) v(t + 1) with probability87
pjσ˜j (1 − pi), that is, the probability that FM j generates and shares a new idea in t+188
(probability pjσ˜j) but FM i fails to generate a new idea in t + 2 (probability 1 − pi).89
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- FM i has t+2 ideas, FM j has at least t+2 ideas, and FM i’s payoffs are (1 − θ) v(t+2)90
with probability pjσ˜jpi (1 − pjσ˜j), that is, the probability that (i) FM j generates and91
shares a new idea in t + 1 (probability pjσ˜j), FM i generates and shares a new idea in92
t+2 (probability pi), but FM j fails to generate a new idea in t+3 (probability 1−pj);93
or (ii) FM j generates and shares a new idea in t+1 (probability pjσ˜j), FM i generates94
and shares a new idea in t + 2 (probability pi), and FM j generates a new idea but95
conceals it in t + 3 (probability pj (1 − σ˜j)).96
- Both FMs have t + 3 ideas and FM i’s payoffs are (1 − θ) v(t + 3) with probability97 (pjσ˜j)2 pi (1 − pi), that is, the probability that (i) FM j generates and shares a new98
idea in t+1 (probability pjσ˜j), FM i generates and shares a new idea in t+2 (probability99
pi), FM j generates and shares a new idea in t+ 3 (probability pjσ˜j), but FM i fails to100
generate a new idea in t + 4 (probability 1 − pi).101
- FM i has t+4 ideas, FM j has at least t+4 ideas, and FM i’s payoffs are (1 − θ) v(t+4)102
with probability (pjσ˜j)2 (pi)2 (1 − pjσ˜j), that is, the probability that (i) FM j generates103
and shares a new idea in t+1 (probability pjσ˜j), FM i generates and shares a new idea104
in t + 2 (probability pi), FM j generates and shares a new idea in t + 3 (probability105
pjσ˜j), FM i generates and shares a new idea in t + 4 (probability pi), but FM j fails106
to generate a new idea in t + 5 (probability 1 − pj); or (ii) FM j generates and shares107
a new idea in t + 1 (probability pjσ˜j), FM i generates and shares a new idea in t + 2108
(probability pi), FM j generates and shares a new idea in t + 3 (probability pjσ˜j), FM109
i generates and shares a new idea in t + 4 (probability pi), FM j generates a new idea110
but conceals it in t + 5 (probability pj (1 − σ˜j)).111
- FM i’s payoffs are (1 − θ) v(t + 5) with probability (pjσ˜j)3 (pi)2 (1 − pi).112
- FM i’s payoffs are (1 − θ) v(t + 6) with probability (pjσ˜j)3 (pi)3 (1 − pjσ˜j).113
- etc.114
Continuing in this fashion and summing up FM i’s payoffs for each q = 0, . . . ,∞ weighted115
by the respective probability yields the expression for FM i’s expected payoffs from sharing.116
Q.E.D.117
2.3 Characterization of Equilibria118
In Proposition 1 in the main text, we characterize FM i’s incentive to share given success119
probabilities pi and her own expectations about FM j’s behavior in the following rounds,120
σ˜j. In his section, we provide characterizations of the equilibria (in both pure strategies and121
mixed strategies) in the model of word-of-mouth communication.122
12
We characterize the pure-strategy equilibria in Lemma B3 below using the functional123
form for the valuation function in the main text: v(n) = 1 − βn. We can rewrite the sharing124
condition in expression (7) in the main text as:125
σ˜j ≥ θ(1 − θ + βpi)βpj . (B3)
This condition defines FM i’s best response function, si ∶ [0,1]→ {share, conceal}. If FM j126
is expected to share with sufficiently high probability, that means, if σ˜j is sufficiently high,127
then FM i will share. Conversely, if FM i expects FM j to share a newly generated idea with128
low probability, then FM i will in return choose to conceal her idea and end the conversation:129
si(σ˜j) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
share if σ˜j ≥ θ(1 − θ + βpi)βpj
conceal if σ˜j < θ(1 − θ + βpi)βpj . (B4)
Given this best-response function and the analogous function sj(σ˜i) for FM j, we characterize130
the pure-strategy equilibria of word-of-mouth communication as follows:131
Lemma B3. Let v(n) = 1 − βn:132
1. A pure-strategy equilibrium in which both FMs never share an idea always exists.133
2. A pure-strategy equilibrium in which both FMs always share a newly generated idea and134
communication continues until one of the FMs fails to generate a new idea exists only135
if136
1 + βpi
1 + βpj βpj ≥ θ and 1 + βpj1 + βpi βpi ≥ θ. (B5)
Proof. First, note that, in equilibrium, σ˜j = σj.137
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1. Suppose FM j always conceals and σj = 0. Then FM i’s sharing condition in expres-138
sion (7) in the main text:,139
φi(pi, pj, σj) ≡ 1 + βpi
1 + βpjσj βpjσj − θ ≥ 0
is violated in all t because φi(pi, pj,0) = −θ < 0 so that σi = 0. For σi = 0, FM j’s sharing140
condition is violated in all t because φj(pj, pi,0) = −θ < 0 so that σj = 0, inducing FM141
i to conceal in all t.142
2. In order for a FM i to share, her necessary condition φi(pi, pj, σj) ≥ 0 must be satisfied,143
given FM j’s strategy σj. We first show that if the two conditions in the Lemma are144
satisfied, then both FMs always share a newly generated idea. We then show that, if at145
least one of them is violated, neither FM i nor FM j will ever share a newly generated146
idea.147
- First, observe that if both FMs always share and σi = σj = 1, then the two148
conditions in (B5) are equivalent to φ˜i ∶= φi(pi, pj,1) ≥ 0 and φ˜j ∶= φj(pj, pi,1) ≥ 0.149
If φ˜i ≥ 0 and FM i anticipates (in equilibrium) that FM j continues in all t′ > t so150
that σj = 1, then FM i continues in any t because her necessary condition φ˜i ≥ 0151
holds. Then σi = 1. If φ˜j ≥ 0 and FM j anticipates (as FM i’s best response to152
σj) that FM i continues in all t′ > t so that σi = 1, then FM j continues in any t153
because her necessary condition φ˜j ≥ 0 holds. Then σj = 1.154
- Now suppose that φ˜j ≥ 0 but φ˜i < 0. This implies that φi(pi, pj,1) < 0, and155
φi(pi, pj, σj) < 0 for all σj because φi(pi, pj, σj) increases in σj (see Proposition 1156
in the main text). This means that for any strategy σj, FM i conceals an idea in t.157
Anticipating this, FM j expects in t−1 payoffs of EUi(share@t−1) = (1 − θ) v(t−1)158
when it shares and Ui(conceal@t−1) = v(t−1)−θv(t−2) when it conceals. It decides159
to conceal because EUi(share@t − 1) < Ui(conceal@t − 1) as v(t − 1) > v(t − 2).160
Because FM i conceals in any t, FM j will respond by concealing in any t − 1.161
The game therefore unravels and FM A conceals in t = 1.162
- The analogous argument applies to the case of φ˜i ≥ 0 but φ˜j < 0. Q.E.D.163
The first result in Lemma B3 suggests that, irrespective of the underlying parameters,164
there is always an equilibrium in which communication is not sustainable and new ideas165
are not shared. In the scenario in which an equilibrium with communication exists (i.e.,166
the conditions in the Lemma hold), the no-communication equilibrium (part 1) is payoff-167
dominated by the communication equilibrium (part 2).168
Observe that, if pi > pj, then FM i’s sharing condition is the binding condition for169
word-of-mouth communication to be sustained in equilibrium. More generally, the binding170
condition is the condition for the FM with the higher success probability.171
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In Lemma B4, we characterize the mixed-strategy equilibrium when the two necessary172
conditions (B5) for a sharing equilibrium in Lemma B3 are satisfied.173
Lemma B4. Let the two conditions in Lemma B3 be satisfied. The communication game174
has a mixed strategy equilibrium in which FM i = A,B, i ≠ j, shares newly arrived ideas with175
probability176
σi = θ(1 − θ + βpj)βpi . (B6)
Proof. In equilibrium, a FM’s expectations about the rival’s strategy are correct, that means,177
σ˜j = σj. Moreover, in a mixed-strategy equilibrium, FM i chooses a mixed strategy if she178
is indifferent between share and conceal. By the expression in (B4), FM i is indifferent if179
σ˜j = σj = θ(1−θ+βpi)βpj , and therefore indifferent between the pure actions and any mixture, σi.180
If σi = θ(1−θ+βpj)βpi , then FM j is indifferent and willing to play a strategy σj as above. Q.E.D.181
Lemma B4 characterizes the time-invariant mixed-strategy equilibrium for the com-182
munication game when the conditions for a sharing equilibrium in Lemma B3 are satisfied.183
For θ > 0, FM i will share with strictly positive probability. Moreover, FM i shares with184
probability strictly less than unity if185
1 + βpj
1 + βpi βpi > θ.
This means that only when the sharing condition for FM j in Lemma B3 holds with strict186
inequality will FM i randomize between sharing and concealing a new idea.187
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3 Material for Experiment188
3.1 Instructions (for Treatment Low-High)189
Experiment Overview190
You are about to participate in an experiment on the economics of decision-making. If you191
listen carefully and make good decisions, you can earn a considerable amount of money. You192
will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment.193
Please do not communicate with the other participants. If you have questions, please194
raise your hand. The experimenter will come to you to answer them.195
It will take you about 90 minutes to complete this session. After the experiment, you196
will be given a short survey to complete.197
You will be working with a fictitious currency called Francs.198
Exchange rate: 100 Francs = 1 USD199
Today’s experiment consists of two tasks. In Task 1, you will be asked to choose200
from a pair of options. Each option involves two payments. Each payment has a specified201
probability (i.e., choose one of two lotteries). For Task 2, you and another player in this202
room will be matched to perform a computer experiment.203
Detailed Instructions204
Task 1: Choose a Lottery205
Your decision sheet shows ten decisions listed on the right. Each decision is a paired choice206
between “Choice A” and “Choice B.” You will make ten decisions and record these in the207
first column. You may choose A for some decision rows and B for other rows. You may208
change your decisions and make them in any order. Only one of these decisions will be used209
to determine your earnings upon completion of Task 2.210
A ten-sided die is used to determine your earnings. The faces are numbered from 1211
to 10 (the “0” face will serve as 10.) After you have made all of your Task 1 decisions and212
completed the computer experiment (Task 2) you will be asked to come to the front desk.213
The experimenter will throw the die twice: The first throw will determine which of your214
ten decisions is to be used. Given your choice for this decision (A or B), the second throw215
will determine your earnings (in Francs). The earnings for this choice will be added to your216
earnings from Task 2, and, when finished, you will be paid all earnings in cash.217
Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of these will affect your earnings.218
You will not know in advance which decision will be used. Obviously, each decision has an219
equal chance of being used in the end.220
Look at Decision 1 and Decision 2:221
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Choice Choice A Choice B
Write Die face 1 pays 200 (chance of 1/10) Die face 1 pays 385 (chance of 1/10)
A or B Die face 2-10 pays 160 (chance of 9/10) Die face 2-10 pays 10 (chance of 9/10)
Write Die face 1-2 pays 200 (chance of 2/10) Die face 1-2 pays 385 (chance of 2/10)
A or B Die face 3-10 pays 160 (chance of 8/10) Die face 3-10 pays 10 (chance of 8/10)
222
For Decision 1, Choice A pays 200 Francs if the throw of the ten-sided die is 1 (i.e.,223
with a chance of 1/10), and it pays 160 Francs if the throw is 2 through 10 (i.e., with a224
chance of 9/10). Choice B yields 385 Francs if the throw of the die is 1 (chance of 1/10),225
and it pays 10 Francs if the throw is 2 through 10 (chance of 9/10).226
For Decision 2, Choice A pays 200 Francs if the throw of the ten-sided die is either 1227
or 2 (i.e., with a chance of 2/10), and it pays 160 Francs if the throw is 3 through 10 (i.e.,228
with a chance of 8/10). Choice B yields 385 Francs if the throw of the die is either 1 or 2229
(chance of 2/10), and it pays 10 Francs if the throw is 3 through 10 (chance of 8/10).230
Decisions 3 through 10 are similar except that as you move further down the table,231
the chance of the higher payoff for each choice increases. Since either option in Decision 10232
pays the highest with certainty (200 or 385 Francs), the die will not be needed.233
Are there any questions?234
You may now begin making your choices. Look at the empty boxes on the left side235
of the record sheet. For each decision row, decide between Choice A and B and write your236
decisions in these boxes until all ten decisions are complete.237
Please do not talk with anyone during the experiment. If you have any questions,238
raise your hand. After you have completed this task, please stay in your seat. Once all239
participants have finished, the computer experiment (Task 2) will begin.240
Task 2: Computer Experiment241
Below is an explanation about the decisions you will be making in the computer experiment,242
the players you will be playing against, and the information you will receive and have available243
during this experiment.244
Players: You are a fund manager. Your goal is to earn as much money as possible. Your245
earnings can increase in two ways: a) increase the returns from your investments and b)246
obtain more investors.247
24 people in this room are participating in this experiment. That splits into two248
groups of 12 each. To begin the game, you will be randomly matched with another player249
from your group. Then there will be a series of matches. For the first match, you and this250
player will be randomly assigned roles (either Fund Manager A or Fund Manager B). There251
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will be several matches, all with different players from your group. You will be matched with252
the same person only once. During each match, you will play the game for an undetermined253
number of rounds. From one match to another, your assignment as either Fund Manager254
A or Fund Manager B is determined randomly. You may be assigned as Fund Manager A255
for some matches and as Fund Manager B for other matches. This is determined randomly.256
This means that you will not be matched with a person with whom you have previously257
been matched, regardless of whether you were Fund Manager A or Fund Manager B.258
Your identity is kept anonymous for the entire experiment. You are only displayed259
as “Fund Manager A” or “Fund Manager B.”260
Your decision affects only you and the person with whom you are matched. Your261
decision does not affect the other people participating in this experiment.262
Setup: The investors you are trying to attract are divided into three segments.263
Segment A Segment BSegment C
264
Fund Manager A has completely captured the investors in Segment A. These investors265
have already invested with Fund Manager A and are currently in a lock-up period. This266
means, these investors have agreed not to move their investments for a period of several267
years. Therefore, they are locked-up with Fund Manager A. As Fund Manager A, you charge268
each Segment A investor a fee. As you generate greater returns for investors in Segment A,269
the fee increases. Therefore, even though these investors are locked-up, Fund Manager A is270
better off by generating higher returns for these investors.271
For the same reason, Fund Manager B has completely captured the investors in Seg-272
ment B. As Fund Manager B, you charge a fee to the investors in Segment B. Even though the273
Segment B investors are locked-up, the Fund Manager B receives higher fees by generating274
higher returns for these investors.275
Segment C consists of new investors. They are not locked-up by either of the man-276
agers. Therefore, Fund Manager A and Fund Manager B must compete for the investors277
in Segment C. Investors in Segment C will invest with the fund manager who provides the278
highest expected returns.279
Note that none of the participants in this experiment are assigned the role of “in-280
vestor.” Decisions made by investors are done automatically. This means that investors will281
automatically choose the fund manager who offers the highest expected return.282
Many of the computations are done for you and the payments will be clearly shown283
to you in a table format. You do not have to figure out the fees you want to charge nor the284
expected return of the investment. The computer will automatically compute these for you285
and show you your actual earnings. The only decision you, as the fund manager, will have286
to make is explained below.287
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Decision: Fund managers increase their returns as they gain more knowledge or informa-288
tion about potential investments. This information is referred to as “ideas.” Having more289
ideas will give you an advantage over the other fund manager and you will be able to gen-290
erate higher returns. Furthermore, if you have more ideas than the other fund manager,291
you will capture all the investors in Segment C. Conversely, if you have fewer ideas than the292
other fund manager, you will not capture any of the investors in Segment C. Essentially, the293
manager with the most ideas will capture all the investors in Segment C. Finally, if you and294
the other fund manager have the same number of ideas, then you will split the investors in295
Segment C evenly, but you will both have zero earnings from this segment.296
Note that because Segments A and B’s investments are locked-up, the competition297
between Fund Manager A and Fund Manager B does not affect those investments; however,298
having more ideas will increase the earnings the fund manager receives from Segment A or299
Segment B.300
Your decision, as the fund manager, is to decide whether or not to share301
your ideas with the competing fund manager.302
Fund Manager A initially starts out with one idea. Fund Manager B starts out with303
no ideas. Look at the diagram on the following page.304
• In round 1, Fund Manager A must decide whether or not to share his one idea with305
Fund Manager B (starts with no ideas). If Fund Manager A chooses not to share, the306
match terminates and the earnings are realized. In that case, Fund Manager A has307
one idea and Fund Manager B has no ideas. If Fund Manager A chooses to share, then308
the experiment moves on to round 2.309
• At the beginning of round 2, both fund managers start with one idea. Here, there is310
a 90% chance that Fund Manager B will generate a new idea and a 10% chance that311
Fund Manager B will not be able to generate a new idea (denoted as ı¨¿½chance¨ı¿½ in312
the following diagram). If Fund Manager B does not generate a new idea, then the313
match terminates with each manager having one idea and the earnings are realized. If314
Fund Manager B generates a new idea, then Fund Manager B has a total of two ideas315
while Fund Manager A has only one idea. At this time, Fund Manager B must decide316
whether or not to share this new idea with Fund Manager A. If Fund Manager B does317
not share, then the match terminates and the earnings are realized. If Fund Manager318
B chooses to share, then the experiment moves on to round 3.319
• Similar to the previous round, at the beginning of round 3 both fund managers begin320
with two ideas. This time, there is a 50% chance that Fund Manager A generates a321
new idea and a 50% chance that Fund Manager A will not be able to generate a new322
idea. If Fund Manager A does not generate a new idea, then the match terminates323
with each manager having two ideas and the earnings are realized. If Fund Manager324
A generates a new idea, then Fund Manager A has a total of three ideas while Fund325
Manager B has only two ideas. At this time, Fund Manager A must decide whether or326
not to share this new idea with Fund Manager B. If Fund Manager A does not share,327
then the match terminates and the earnings are realized. If Fund Manager A chooses328
to share, then the experiment moves on to round 4.329
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• This process will continue until the match is terminated. Termination occurs either by330
one of the managers not sharing a new idea or when a new idea fails to be generated.331
As you may have noticed, the decisions are made in alternating sequence between Fund332
Manager A and Fund Manager B. Furthermore, the only way for a fund manager to333
generate a new idea is to have one shared with he or she by the other manager in the334
previous round.335
• Finally, note that the chance of the Fund Manager A generating a new idea is always336
50% while the chance of the Fund Manager B generating a new idea is always 90%.337
Termination of a match: There are two ways your current match can terminate:338
• Chance: At the beginning of each round (after the first round), there is a chance that339
the match terminates. This is because the fund manager (whose turn it is in this340
round) is not able to generate a new idea. This chance of successfully or unsuccessfully341
generating an idea is different between the Fund Manager A and the Fund Manager B.342
For Fund Manager A, there is a 50% chance of generating a new idea and 50% chance343
of failing to generate a new idea. This means that there is a 50% chance that the344
match terminates when it is Fund Manager A’s round. For Fund Manager B, there is345
a 90% chance of generating a new idea and 10% chance of failing to generate a new346
idea. This means that there is a 10% chance that the match terminates when it is347
Fund Manager B’s round.348
Think of a 10% chance as in the following analogy: There are 10 balls in a jar: 9 blue349
balls and 1 red ball. One ball is drawn from the jar and, if it is a red ball, the match350
terminates. The match continues if any one of the blue balls is drawn. In the actual351
experiment, the experiment’s program is used to mimic this process.352
Similarly, think of 50% chance as in the following analogy: There are 2 balls in a jar:353
1 blue ball and 1 red ball. One ball is drawn from the jar and, if it is a red ball,354
the match terminates. The match continues if the blue ball is drawn. In the actual355
experiment, the experiment’s program is used to mimic this process.356
• A fund manager decides not to share an idea: The current match terminates if the fund357
manager decides not to share a newly generated idea.358
The figure below summarizes the above statements:359
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360
Note: “Chance” makes the move before the fund manager is able to decide to share or361
terminate.362
Note: The specific round of termination of a match is not set by the experimenter. The363
match continues (potentially indefinitely) as long as neither the fund managers nor “chance”364
terminates.365
Note: While the other fund manager makes his or her decision you will see a screen asking366
you to wait until it is again your turn. Please always click the “Continue” button when you367
see it on the screen for the experiment to continue.368
Information: You and the person with whom you are matched will both know whether369
the termination is due to “chance” or because the other fund manager decided not to share370
a newly generated idea. When you and the other fund manager have the same realized371
earnings, then the match is terminated by “chance.” If it is not terminated by “chance,”372
then the match is terminated by the other fund manager.373
New Match: When the current match terminates, please wait until everyone else’s match374
terminates as well. When all matches are terminated, you will be randomly matched with375
a new player from your group and begin again. This procedure will be repeated until you376
have been matched exactly once with all other players in your group.377
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Earnings: Earnings for each match are determined in the following manner. First, the378
figure below shows you the total earnings for each fund manager, conditional on how the379
match was terminated.380
381
For a better understanding of earnings when the match is terminated, the following382
table shows each fund manager’s earnings from Segment A, Segment B and Segment C. This383
is the information you will be provided on your computer screen.384
Note: Due to rounding errors (a possible difference of 0.01), the sum of segment earnings385
(Segment A and Segment C for Fund Manager A and Segment B and Segment C for Fund386




Round Terminated by Fund Manager A Fund Manager B
Segment A: 62.50 Segment B: 0.00
1 Fund Manager A Segment C: 37.50 Segment C: 0.00
Total: 100.00 Total: 0.00
Segment A: 62.50 Segment B: 62.50
Chance Segment C: 0.00 Segment C: 0.00
2 Total: 62.50 Total: 62.50
Segment A: 62.50 Segment B: 109.38
Fund Manager B Segment C: 0.00 Segment C: 28.13
Total: 62.50 Total: 137.50
Segment A: 109.38 Segment B: 109.38
Chance Segment C: 0.00 Segment C: 0.00
3 Total: 109.38 Total: 109.38
Segment A: 144.53 Segment B: 109.38
Fund Manager A Segment C: 21.09 Segment C: 0.00
Total: 165.63 Total: 109.38
Segment A: 144.53 Segment B: 144.53
Chance Segment C: 0.00 Segment C: 0.00
4 Total: 144.53 Total: 144.53
Segment A: 144.53 Segment B: 170.90
Fund Manager B Segment C: 0.00 Segment C: 15.82
Total: 144.53 Total: 186.72
Segment A: 170.90 Segment B: 170.90
Chance Segment C: 0.00 Segment C: 0.00
5 Total: 170.90 Total: 170.90
Segment A: 190.67 Segment B: 170.90
Fund Manager A Segment C: 11.87 Segment C: 0.00
Total: 202.54 Total: 170.90
Segment A: 190.67 Segment B: 190.67
Chance Segment C: 0.00 Segment C: 0.00
6 Total: 190.67 Total: 190.67
Segment A: 190.67 Segment B: 205.51
Fund Manager B Segment C: 0.00 Segment C: 8.90
Total: 190.67 Total: 214.40
Segment A: 205.51 Segment B: 205.51
Chance Segment C: 0.00 Segment C: 0.00
7 Total: 205.51 Total: 205.51
Segment A: 216.63 Segment B: 205.51
Fund Manager A Segment C: 6.67 Segment C: 0.00




Round Terminated by Fund Manager A Fund Manager B
Segment A: 216.63 Segment B: 216.63
Chance Segment C: 0.00 Segment C: 0.00
8 Total: 216.63 Total: 216.63
Segment A: 216.63 Segment B: 224.97
Fund Manager B Segment C: 0.00 Segment C: 5.01
Total: 216.63 Total: 229.98
Segment A: 224.97 Segment B: 224.97
Chance Segment C: 0.00 Segment C: 0.00
9 Total: 224.97 Total: 224.97
Segment A: 231.23 Segment B: 224.97
Fund Manager A Segment C: 3.75 Segment C: 0.00
Total: 234.98 Total: 224.97
Segment A: 231.23 Segment B: 231.23
Chance Segment C: 0.00 Segment C: 0.00
10 Total: 231.23 Total: 231.23
Segment A: 231.23 Segment B: 235.92
Fund Manager B Segment C: 0.00 Segment C: 2.82
Total: 231.23 Total: 238.74
Segment A: 235.92 Segment B: 235.92
Chance Segment C: 0.00 Segment C: 0.00
11 Total: 235.92 Total: 235.92
Segment A: 239.44 Segment B: 235.92
Fund Manager A Segment C: 2.11 Segment C: 0.00
Total: 241.55 Total: 235.92
Segment A: 239.44 Segment B: 239.44
Chance Segment C: 0.00 Segment C: 0.00
12 Total: 239.44 Total: 239.44
Segment A: 239.44 Segment B: 242.08
Fund Manager B Segment C: 0.00 Segment C: 1.58
Total: 239.44 Total: 243.66
Segment A: 242.08 Segment B: 242.08
Chance Segment C: 0.00 Segment C: 0.00
13 Total: 242.08 Total: 242.08
Segment A: 244.06 Segment B: 242.08
Fund Manager A Segment C: 1.19 Segment C: 0.00
Total: 245.25 Total: 242.08
Segment A: 244.06 Segment B: 244.06
Chance Segment C: 0.00 Segment C: 0.00
14 Total: 244.06 Total: 244.06
Segment A: 244.06 Segment B: 245.55
Fund Manager B Segment C: 0.00 Segment C: 0.89
Total: 244.06 Total: 246.44
390
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Although the table shows the first 14 rounds, the game continues (potentially indefinitely)391
until the match terminates. For every round during the experiment, you will be provided392
on your computer screen with the current round’s earnings and the next round’s potential393
earnings for both Fund Manager A and Fund Manager B. You may reference the above chart394
as well.395
Note: While each additional idea increases your earnings, the next additional idea adds396
less of an improvement than the previous idea. This means that the first idea results in the397
greatest earnings increase; then the second idea results in a slightly smaller earnings increase;398
then the third idea results in less, and so on.399
In Summary, your earnings as a fund manager are determined in two parts:400
The first part of your earnings is determined by how many ideas you have. The401
more ideas you collect, the greater the return (and earnings) will be for this part. In order to402
collect more ideas, you and the other fund manager must generate and share your respective403
ideas with each other. In this way, having more ideas always increases Fund Manager A404
earnings from Segment A or for Fund Manager B from Segment B.405
The second part of your earnings is determined by whether you have more ideas406
than the fund manager you are currently matched with. Finishing the game with more ideas407
than the other fund manager means that you will capture all the investors in Segment C.408
Thus, you will capture all the earnings from Segment C as well. Conversely, finishing the409
game with the same number of ideas as the other fund manager, or less ideas, will result in410
you having no earnings from Segment C.411
Expectations: During the round in which you are deciding whether or not to share a412
newly generated idea, you will be asked the following question:413
If, in the next round, the other fund manager successfully generates a new idea (i.e.,414
“chance” does not terminate the match), how likely do you think the other fund manager will415
share this newly generated idea with you?416
In the field provided, fill in these expectations. Enter a number between 0% and417
100% (You do not have to add the %-sign).418
Note: The probability that the other fund manager generates a new idea in the next round419
is 50% for Fund Manager A and 90% for the Fund Manager B. You are asked to enter your420
expectations of the other fund manager sharing this idea given that it has been generated.421
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Quiz422
Note: The quiz does not affect your earnings.423
1. Assume that you are Fund Manager A. During Round 6, do you make a decision?424
2. Assume that you are Fund Manager B. During Round 3, Fund Manager A decided not425
to share the new idea with you. What are your earnings?426
3. Assume that you are Fund Manager B. During Round 5, Fund Manager A has decided427
to share his or her idea with you. At the beginning of Round 6, however, you fail to428
generate a new idea (“chance” terminates the match). What are your earnings? What429
are Fund Manager A’s earnings?430
4. In question 3, do you, as Fund Manager B, get to make a decision after “chance”431
terminates the match in Round 5 (i.e., when Fund Manager A fails to generate a new432
idea)?433
5. Assume that you are Fund Manager B. During Round 5, Fund Manager A has decided434
to share the new idea with you. At the beginning of Round 6, “chance” does not435
terminate your match (i.e., you generate a new idea). What are your earnings if you436
do not share the new idea? What are Fund Manager A’s earnings?437
6. In question 5, if you, as Fund Manager B, decide to share the new idea, then “chance”438
will determine whether the game terminates or not. If “chance” does not terminate439
(i.e., Fund Manager A generates a new idea), does Fund Manager A get to make his440
or her decision on whether to share the new idea with you?441
7. Assume that you are Fund Manager B. In any round when it is your turn to make a442
decision, “chance” will first determine whether the game terminates or not. What is443
the probability that you fail to generate a new idea (the game terminates) and prevents444
you from making your decision?445
8. Assume that you are Fund Manager A. After the first round, in any round when446
it is your turn to make a decision, “chance” will first determine whether the game447
terminates or not. What is the probability that you successfully generate a new idea448
(game does not terminate) and allows you the make your decision?449
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Procedural Summary450
Here is what will happen after the instructions:451
1. The first match will begin and you will be told what role you are assigned (Fund452
Manager A or Fund Manager B).453
2. When it is your turn to make a decision (i.e., you have generated a new idea), you will454
be shown the earnings for this and the next several rounds; asked whether you wish455
to share your idea or not; and also asked to estimate the probability that the matched456
fund manager will choose to share his or her idea in next round. This continues until457
the match is terminated, but there is no predetermined end point for any given match:458
the match can be terminated only by “chance” (i.e., a fund manager fails to generate459
a new idea) or by the fund manager (he or she decides not to share). You will then be460
shown your earnings and the other fund manager’s earnings. Because there are other461
matches simultaneously participating in this experiment, you must wait until everyone462
else’s matches are also terminated.463
3. When all matches are terminated, you will be randomly matched with another person464
and randomly assigned a new role (A or B). Then you and the new match will play465
the game again.466
4. This continues until there are no more possible matches with the people in your group.467
You will know that the experiment has ended when you see a final survey showing up468
on your screen.469
5. The experimenter will then ask you individually to come to the front. You will be paid470
in cash. Your total cash will be based upon the outcome of your decision in Task 1; and471
how much you earned in your matches combined during today’s computer experiment472
(Task 2). In other words, you will be paid the total of Task 1 and Task 2 earnings.473
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3.2 Record Sheet for Holt-Laury Task474
Task 1: Choose a Lottery475
Please write your choices in the box provided on the left. Select either Choice A or Choice476
B, and write “A” or “B” to indicate your selection.477
Your
Choice: Choice A Choice B
Die face 1 pays 200 (chance of 1/10) Die face 1 pays 385 (chance of 1/10)
Die face 2-10 pays 160 (chance of 9/10) Die face 2-10 pays 10 (chance of 9/10)
Die face 1-2 pays 200 (chance of 2/10) Die face 1-2 pays 385 (chance of 2/10)
Die face 3-10 pays 160 (chance of 8/10) Die face 3-10 pays 10 (chance of 8/10)
Die face 1-3 pays 200 (chance of 3/10) Die face 1-3 pays 385 (chance of 3/10)
Die face 4-10 pays 160 (chance of 7/10) Die face 4-10 pays 10 (chance of 7/10)
Die face 1-4 pays 200 (chance of 4/10) Die face 1-4 pays 385 (chance of 4/10)
Die face 5-10 pays 160 (chance of 6/10) Die face 5-10 pays 10 (chance of 6/10)
Die face 1-5 pays 200 (chance of 5/10) Die face 1-5 pays 385 (chance of 5/10)
Die face 6-10 pays 160 (chance of 5/10) Die face 6-10 pays 10 (chance of 5/10)
Die face 1-6 pays 200 (chance of 6/10) Die face 1-6 pays 385 (chance of 6/10)
Die face 7-10 pays 160 (chance of 4/10) Die face 7-10 pays 10 (chance of 4/10)
Die face 1-7 pays 200 (chance of 7/10) Die face 1-7 pays 385 (chance of 7/10)
Die face 8-10 pays 160 (chance of 3/10) Die face 8-10 pays 10 (chance of 3/10)
Die face 1-8 pays 200 (chance of 8/10) Die face 1-8 pays 385 (chance of 8/10)
Die face 9-10 pays 160 (chance of 2/10) Die face 9-10 pays 10 (chance of 2/10)
Die face 1-9 pays 200 (chance of 9/10) Die face 1-9 pays 385 (chance of 9/10)
Die face 10 pays 160 (chance of 1/10) Die face 10 pays 10 (chance of 1/10)
Die face 1-10 pays 200 (chance of 1) Die face 1-10 pays 385 (chance of 1)
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